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 1 
Summary 
As already given away by the title, the purpose of this thesis is to discuss 
whether different national interpretations of the term “employee” in the 
context of the national concept of unfair dismissal sit comfortably with the 
rationale for the Union concept of “worker” (in the context of free 
movement) developed by the Court of Justice and whether different national 
interpretations can be justified in the light of the potential unlevelling of the 
internal market and Article 30 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, (“the 
CFR”). 
To answer the above question the thesis starts by exploring the way that the 
social dimension and in particular EU employment law has developed since 
the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In the pursuit of creating an internal market free 
of distortions a uniform EU concept of the term ”worker” was developed by 
the Court of Justice. Consequently, the concept of worker (in the context of 
free movement) has been interpreted extensively to in some circumstances 
even include EU citizens. It will be seen that the Court of Justice’s 
willingness to extend the scope of the term has varied depending on the legal 
context. The rationale relied on by the Court in its interpretations has also 
varied, sometimes it has relied on an economic integrationist rationale to 
justify the need for a uniform Union term and other times it has explained its 
reasoning for a Union term by reference to a social rationale. 
The term “employee” as defined by the courts in Sweden and England for 
the purpose of the national concept of unfair dismissal is then considered. It 
is my contention that different national interpretations of the term 
“employee” (amongst other national factors) can operate to create 
disharmony in the internal market and thereby delay the realisation of a level 
playing field where businesses in the EU can compete on equal terms. In 
particular, I will argue for a common EU concept of the term “employee” in 
the context of the Acquired Rights Directive (which presently makes 
reference to definitions in accordance with national law) as the present 
situation may operate to grant the Member States an unacceptable discretion 
over the directive’s application in a way that hardly could have been the 
purpose of the protection that the directive sought to afford the Union’s 
workers in the 1970’s.  
The potential impact that the CFR may have on the Member States’ national 
employment protection relating to unfair dismissal is also considered and in 
particular whether the right not to be unjustified dismissed, (conferred on all 
”workers” by Article 30 of the CFR), introduces a minimum floor of 
employment protection or a universally applicable concept which, (in 
accordance with the rationale adopted by the Court of Justice in Levin), 
would appear to require a Union definition. Although not intended to 
introduce any additional rights, it has been suggested that the Court of 
Justice may be influenced or find support in the CFR to expand the EU’s 
 2 
competences and that some of the rights under the CFR may be sufficiently 
clear and precise to create direct effect. If Article 30 is sufficiently clear and 
precise it will be interesting to consider how the right to protection against 
unjustified dismissal may come to be interpreted and what role that would 
leave the national concepts of unfair dismissal. The EU’s competence in the 
field of employment is also considered. 
 3 
Sammanfattning 
Som titeln avslöjar är syftet med uppsatsen att diskutera om olika 
medlemsstatliga tolkningar av begreppet ”arbetstagare” (såsom begreppet 
tolkats i medlemsstaternas nationella reglering av osakliga uppsägningar) 
kan rättfärdigas mot bakgrund av de av EU domstolen uttalade motiv som 
har åberopats för en unionstolkning av begreppet ”arbetare” inom EU rätten. 
Det ifrågasätts om olika nationella tolkningar är acceptabla med tanke på 
den obalans som enligt författarens uppfattning olika tolkningar av 
begreppet kan leda till på den interna marknaden samt mot bakgrund av 
artikel 30 i rättighetsstadgan. 
 
I syfte att försöka besvara frågeställningen ovan inleder uppsatsen med att 
utforska hur den sociala dimensionen, och särskilt arbetsrätten, har 
utvecklats sedan Romfördraget 1957. I syfte att skapa en intern marknad fri 
från konkurrenshinder kom EU domstolen att utveckla begreppet ”arbetare” 
till ett uniformt vidsträckt EU koncept. Begreppet ”arbetare” har tolkats 
extensivt och har ibland utvidgats till att inkludera EU medborgare. EU 
domstolens vilja att utvidga begreppet har också varierat beroende på vilket 
lagområde som berörts. De motiv som EU domstolen åberopat har också 
varierat. Ibland har domstolen uttalat att ett ekonomiskt motiv (i 
integreringssyfte) har kunnat rättfärdiga en EU konform tolkning av 
begreppet arbetstagare medan ett socialt motiv andra gånger har förklarats 
ligga bakom domstolens extensiva tolkning.  
 
Vidare utreds begreppet arbetstagare (såsom det tolkats av de svenska och 
engelska domstolarna i de båda ländernas nationella reglering av osakliga 
uppsägningar). Det är författarens uppfattning att olika nationella tolkningar 
av arbetstagarbegreppet (i kombination med andra nationella skillnader) kan 
leda till att skapa en obalans på den interna marknaden och därmed hindra 
förverkligandet av ett jämnt spelfält där företag kan konkurrera på lika 
villkor. Författaren argumenterar framförallt för en EU konform tolkning av 
begreppet arbetstagare i företagsöverlåtelse direktivet som för tillfället 
hänvisar till medlemsstaternas nationella tolkningar av arbetstagarbegreppet 
istället för en EU konform tolkning. Författaren menar att den nuvarande 
situation kan leda till att medlemsstaterna ges kontroll över direktivets 
tillämpningsområde på ett sätt som inte kan anses vara förenligt med dess 
skyddssyfte. 
 
Uppsatsen diskuterar vidare om rättighetsstadgan kan antas få någon 
påverkan på medlemsstaternas nationella reglering av osakliga uppsägningar 
och ifrågasätter om skyddet i artikel 30 av rättighetsstadgan som sträcker sig 
till alla ”arbetare” ska ses som ett minimiskydd eller ett universellt EU 
koncept som (i linje med EU domstolens tolkning i Levin) torde kräva en 
EU konform unions tolkning. Trots att rättighetsstadgan uttryckligen inte 
medfört några utvidgade rättigheter har det uttalats viss oro för att EU 
domstolen i framtiden kan komma att använda sig av rättighetsstadgan för 
 4 
att söka expandera EU’s kompetens områden. Det har också spekulerats 
över att några av rättigheterna i rättighetsstadgan kan vara tillräckligt tydliga 
och precisa för att kunna skapa direkt effect. Om detta är korrekt ifråga om 
artikel 30 kan man fundera över hur rätten mot godtyckliga uppsägningar 
kan komma att tolkas samt vilken roll det nationella konceptet av skydd mot 
osakliga uppsägningar kan tänkas få. EU’s kompetens inom arbetsrättens 
område diskuteras också. 
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TFEU  The Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
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1 Introduction  
The EU has long been characterised by a somewhat unsteady compromise 
between the economic forces and the social, between free market principles 
on the one hand - in particular the completion of the EU internal market 
where competition must not be “distorted” - and on the other, support for 
national  employment law and social welfare.    
EU employment law can be described as attempting to bridge these two 
competing dimensions. Similar contradictions are also encountered when 
trying to reconcile the EU concept “worker” and the national concept 
“employee” in the context of EU employment law. More recently, through 
the Treaty of Lisbon and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, (“the CFR”), 
certain employment rights, (which never had been considered to fall within 
the EU’s competence sphere), were also given an elevated status as legally 
binding fundamental rights and thereby adding to the complexity over the 
EU’s future role in EU employment law. 
 
 
1.1 The EU concept “worker” 
In the pursuit of creating an internal market free of distortions and in the 
context of free movement the uniform EU concept “worker” developed. As 
one of the four freedoms forming the foundations of the internal market, 
Article 45 TFEU and the Court of Justice’s definition of “worker” has been 
interpreted widely and objectively.
1
 The term worker, which initially 
applied mainly to the category of workers generally classed as employees 
has since been extended to, in some circumstances, include other persons 
engaged in economic activity and sometimes even those without a contract 
of employment, such as students in vocational training
2
 and unemployed 
persons looking for work
3
 and (more recently) EU citizens in general.
4
 The 
underlying rationales for the Court’s extensive interpretation will be 
considered further in the following chapter. 
 
The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 1989, 
(the predecessor to the CFR), which included fundamental rights of 
individual employment has also assisted in strengthening the conception of 
the citizen-worker further
5
, (although there has not to my knowledge been 
any direct claims that the “worker” referred to in the CFR should be defined 
in the same way as the concept “worker” developed by the Court of Justice 
in the context of free movement). Despite this, Article 45 TFEU has not 
been considered an autonomous right but rather an ancillary, purposeful 
                                                 
1
 Barnard, (2006), p. 172. 
2
 Case 39/86 Lair [1988] ECR 3161 
3
 Case C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745 
4
 Nyström, (2011), p. 123 and Bercusson, (2009), p. 370 ff. 
5
 Bercusson, (2009), p. 376. 
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right within the framework of the economic objectives of the Union – a right 
conferred for reasons of the performing of an economic activity or as 
described by Blainpain: “a contribution to the economic needs of the 
Member States”.6  
 
At this stage, it should be remembered that the EU’s primary aim always 
was economic and that the social dimension and national employment laws 
were not considered to be areas in need of harmonisation. Any necessary 
convergence in the field of national labour laws and practice (and hence 
costs) was expected to follow from the creation of the internal market. In 
fact, the decision by the Member States to leave the areas of social policy 
and labour law in the hands of the Member States was a conscious decision 
based on recommendations in the Ohlin Report
7
, commissioned from the 
International Labour Organization, (“ILO”),  before the Treaty of Rome was 
signed on 25 March 1957. The Ohlin Report had suggested that strong 
national labour law systems would be necessary in order to counterweight 
the consequences of market integration.
8
 
 
1.2 Social dumping concerns 
Already before the EU’s expansions to the east in 2004 and 2007 increased 
concerns about social dumping were often raised by the Member States in 
the west. The term social dumping is often referring to the situation where 
workers from certain countries are competing for employment by offering 
cheaper labour to employers in countries where salaries in general are 
higher. Social dumping does however also encompass the situation where 
companies move their production to countries where labour costs are lower 
and thus gaining a competitive advantage.
9
  
It is important to appreciate that labour costs in this context refer not only to 
direct costs such as wages but to the employer’s total expense in relation to 
the employees. The term labour costs therefore include additional costs, 
often referred to as indirect costs that are imposed on the employer by 
national systems of labour law and social protection. These include the 
employer’s contributions to social security funds, sick pay together with 
other social payments and not least the costs of complying with labour law 
standards.
10
 Labour costs have been estimated to account for two thirds of 
the production costs of goods and services and as such it is evident that they 
will have a considerable influence on political, economic and social decision 
makers.
11
 For multinational enterprises it will therefore be tempting to 
                                                 
6
 Blainpain, R, ELL – Suppl. 335 (March 2008), p. 2.  
7
 Ohlin Report (1956) 
8
 Bruun/Lörcher/Schömann, (2012), p. 22. 
9
 Nyström, (2011), p. 108. 
10
 Bercusson, (2009), p. 133. 
11
 Eurostat, EU labour costs 1999, Statistics in focus, Population and social conditions, 3, 
3/2001 
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relocate their current establishments to countries where labour costs are 
lower.
12
 
That differences between the Member States’ national labour law system and 
labour costs would have an impact on competition between companies 
operating in the internal market did soon become clear to the European 
Commission which already in 1990 suggested that harmonisation of indirect 
costs, such as costs of dismissal protection, social security contributions and 
other forms of taxation should be considered.
13
  The reason for this 
suggestion was to prevent a situation where the Member States are forced to 
deregulate and reduce their labour standards in order to attract new business 
investments, a scenario often described as a “race to the bottom”.14  
Lack of political consensus between the Member States coupled with 
insufficient EU competence in the social field did however mean that the 
European Commission’s suggestion was not taken up. The Court of 
Justice’s more recent and highly debated decisions in Viking15 and Laval16 
have however refuelled the concerns of social dumping
17
 and with the UK 
conservative led government recently raising the bar for employment 
protection against unfair dismissal by increasing the required years of 
service from one to two years it now appears that the scenario which the 
European Commission had foreseen might become reality. The recent 
legislative changes, which were criticised by the trade unions for opening up 
for what could become a “hire and fire culture”, became effective on 6 
April 2012.
 18
 
 
1.3 Problem 
For the most part, the Member States’ labour law systems tend to address a 
common set of problems. One can therefore be forgiven for thinking that 
any national differences between the Member States’ labour law systems 
will be marginal and have limited effect on competition between enterprises 
in the internal market.  
 
The Member States’ labour law traditions do however have very dissimilar 
origins as a result of their different legal heritages.
19
In addition, even 
                                                 
12
 Bercusson, (2009), p.134. 
13
 COM(90)228 
14
 Barnard, (2006), p. 51.  
15
 C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779 
16 C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11767 
17
 Barnard, ”Social dumping or dumping socialism?”, Cambridge Law Journal, Volume 67, 
Issue 02, July 2008, p. 262 ff.  
 
18
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2012/apr/06/unfair-dismissal-reform   
19
 The EU’s Member States can very broadly be divided into three groups of legal systems. 
The Swedish legal system, together with the Danish and Finnish legal systems, fall into the 
Nordic group. The English legal system, together with the Irish forms part of the Anglo-
Saxon group and the French legal system (together with Austria, Germany, France, 
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Member States with similar legal origins and formally similar legal 
provisions and concepts can often be distinguished by different national 
interpretations and thereby emerge as very different in their practical 
operation, with the potential effect of disharmony in (or even distortion of)  
the internal market.
20
 An illustrative example of this is the discussion that 
followed from the Commission allowing different national interpretations of 
the concept “pressing business reasons” which justified dismissal under a 
draft of the Acquired Rights Directive
21. Despite recognising the “elastic 
definition of this concept” the Commission refused to define the concept – 
an approach criticised by the European Parliament in the European 
Industrial Relations Review.
22
 
 
The criticism from the European Parliament is easy to understand.  The 
consequence of the applicability of an EU directive (aimed towards 
harmonisation) being determined at Member State level, will doubtless have 
the effect of creating different practical applications of the directive in 
question (now potentially by 27 different interpretations) and thereby 
potentially also undesirable competition between enterprises in the internal 
market.  
 
In a similar fashion, the directive also left the interpretation of the term 
“employee” to the Member States’ national courts with no guidance from 
the Court of Justice. By way of comparison, the EU definition “worker” (in 
the context of free movement) has been given a wide and purposive 
interpretation which also has been extended to other areas of EU law. 
 
Despite the fact that the Acquired Rights Directive only had intended to 
achieve partial harmonisation rather than a uniform level of protection for 
all EU workers affected by the economic effects of the internal market, this 
is, (in my view), far from satisfying as it gives the Member States a 
discretion as to which categories of workers who will enjoy the additional 
dismissal protection under the directive. By employing a more restrictive 
definition of the term “employee” the Member States can also reduce the 
scope of the directive as it is inevitable that a less extensive definition of the 
term will result in fewer workers being covered by the protection under the 
directive. Such a discretion as to the definition of the term will also have the 
inevitable effect of the scope of the directive being applied differently in the 
EU’s 27 different Member States. 
 
The case of AKZO provides an illustrative example of the potential effects 
of different levels of protection in national labour laws. AKZO concerned a 
multinational company with subsidiaries in different Member States. Prior to 
                                                                                                                            
Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece) forms part of the 
Romano-Germanic group. 
20
 Bercusson, (2009), p. 112. 
21
 Directive 77/187/EEC as amended by Directive 98/50/EC and consolidated in Council 
Directive 2001/23/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses 
or parts of undertakings or businesses 
22
 EIRR, No. 5 (May 1974), p. 9 at p. 13 and No. 13, (January 1975), p. 6. 
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undergoing a restructuring programme, AKZO compared the costs of 
dismissal in the different Member States where its subsidiaries were based 
and proceeded to dismiss in the Member State where the costs of doing so 
were the lowest.
23
 With the Acquired Rights Directive only providing for 
partial harmonisation there are no guarantees that the scenario in the AKZO 
case will not be repeated although, ironically, the upshot of that case was 
reverse to what normally happens where the forces of the internal market 
meet with social policy initiatives in that the employees in the Member State 
with the higher dismissal protection were spared. Whether the labour costs in 
that Member State also were higher can however only be speculated over – 
but it would seem unlikely.  
 
In times of recession and financial austerity the temptation for the Member 
States’ governments to operate deregulation policies to compete with other 
Member States is greater than ever. As seen in 1.1 above, the European 
Commission had already in its proposal from 1990 suggested that 
harmonisation of indirect wage costs such as dismissal protection should 
take place, in an attempt to prevent a downward spiral in respect of 
employment rights in the Member States.
24
 
 
1.4 Aim and Limitation 
As perhaps already given away by the title, the aim of this thesis is threefold 
in that it sets out to explore:  
 
1) How the national courts in Sweden and England have interpreted the 
term “employee” in the context of their national concepts of 
protection against unfair dismissal;  
  
2) Whether different national interpretations of the term “employee” sit 
comfortably with the rationale for the EU term “worker” which has 
been given a wide and uniform interpretation by the Court of Justice 
in order to facilitate the realisation of an internal market free from 
distortions; and 
 
3) The potential impact that the right not to be unjustified dismissed in 
Article 30 of the CFR may have on the Member States national 
concepts of unfair dismissal. 
The starting point for the discussion is my contention that different national 
interpretations of the term “employee” in the context of unfair dismissal 
regulations (amongst other national factors) can operate to create 
disharmony in the internal market and thereby delay the realisation of a level 
playing field where businesses in the EU can compete on equal terms. It is 
my disputation that the present situation grants the Member States an 
                                                 
23
 Barnard, (2006), p. 672. 
24
 COM(90)228 
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unacceptable discretion over the directive’s application in a way that hardly 
could have been the purpose of the protection that it sought to afford the 
Union’s workers in the 1970’s. Accordingly, I will argue for a common 
Union definition of the term “employee” for the purpose of the application 
of the Acquired Rights Directive. In doing so I will also consider any 
potential limits placed on the EU’s competence in this field and, (in light of 
Article 30 of the CFR), the possibility of the Court of Justice developing a 
common EU concept of unfair or unjustified dismissal extended to the CFR 
“worker”. 
The answer to the first limb is based on the comparative study undertaken of 
two of the Member States’ laws relating to unfair dismissal. The countries 
that have been chosen for this comparison are Sweden and England. The 
most important reason for my decision to choose these countries for the 
comparison was the fact that the legal systems and the approach to 
employment law in these two countries traditionally and historically are very 
different. The fact that I currently practice law in England and have done so 
since 2008, when the recession started, did undeniably also play a significant 
part in terms of my choice of subject. It should also be noted that the 
comparison (which is found in chapter 3) is focusing on the eligibility 
criteria and the definition of the term “employee”. Although a brief overview 
of the two Member States’ unfair dismissal systems is provided the chapter 
does not set out to make a full comparison of every differentiating aspect of 
the two Member States’ national laws on unfair dismissal.  
 
The discussion flowing from the second limb is largely influenced by the 
rationale given by the Court of Justice when interpreting the term “worker” 
(in the context of free movement) and also by the Court’s approach to the 
term “employee” in the context of the Acquired Rights Directive, (which, 
having been implemented at national level, forms part of the Member 
States’ national concepts of unfair dismissal).  
 
The third limb finally explores the potential effect of Article 30 of the CFR. 
Since the CFR became legally binding concerns have been raised, (in 
particular from the UK), that Article 30 which provides that “Every worker 
has the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with 
Union law and national laws and practices” could operate to provide UK 
workers with an additional (and perhaps extended) layer of employment 
protection rights, resulting in unjustified dismissal becoming a Union 
concept.
25
 
                                                 
25
 Barnard, ”The Opt-Out for the UK and Poland from the Charter of Fundamental Rights:  
Triumph of Rhetoric over Reality?”, Trinity College Cambridge, (published in Griller, S 
and Ziller, J, The Lisbon Treaty, Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für 
Europaforschung (ECSA Austria)/European Community Studies Association of Austria 
Publication Series, Volume 11, 2008, p 258 ff.) 
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1.5 Method and Material 
Different research methods have been employed to write this thesis. In 
respect of the initial, descriptive part dealing with the development of 
European Labour Law and the rationale for the EU term “worker” I have 
primarily been assisted by legal doctrine in the form of Bercusson’s 
European Labour Law, Nyström’s EU och arbetsrätten and Barnard’s EC 
Employment Law. Bruun Lörcher and Schömann’s The Lisbon Treaty and 
Social Europe has also been a great source of inspiration for the chapters 
dealing with the potential impact of Article 30 CFR and the EU’s 
competence to legislate in this field of employment. Doctrine consisting of 
various legal articles and the work of leading academics has also been used 
as a compliment to the legal sources throughout the thesis. 
 
The comparative part of this thesis which deals with the national definitions 
of the term employee has been pursued through traditional legal method. An 
analysis based on Swedish and English statutes governing unfair dismissal 
and the nationally implemented Acquired Rights Directive as well as 
significant case law has been carried out in order to reach a conclusion 
about the present legal situation in Sweden and England. In a comparative 
exercise like this, where two national definitions developed independently 
in two different languages are analysed and compared in one language only, 
there will always be a certain risk that some of the nuances of the original 
language gets lost in translation even if one is ever so careful. In this thesis, 
the importance of getting the translation right is however fundamental as the 
very core of the discussion focuses on the potential consequences of 
national differences between the Member States’ definitions of the term 
”employee”.  
 
Finally, I fully appreciate that a comparison like this which places its 
emphasis on limited aspects of the object for comparison does not come 
without difficulties. The risk that inaccurate conclusions are drawn about the 
effect that national differences may have on competition will for example be 
significantly increased where the employment protection systems of the two 
Member States are not examined in their entirety.
26
 
 
1.6 Disposition 
The disposition adopted can be said to consist of three parts, (albeit 
intrinsically linked). The first part of the thesis, chapter two is of a more 
descriptive nature and designed to provide the reader with a good 
understanding of the way European Labour law and Union competence in 
this field has developed over the last few decades. It also serves to explore 
                                                 
26
 Rather than expanding this thesis into a fully encompassing comparison of Sweden and 
England’s different national systems of employment protection, I would instead like to refer 
the reader to already existing comparative literature in this area, such as the working papers 
of the OECD which can be found at www.oecd.org/els/workingpapers. 
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the rationale behind the more extended definition of the Union term 
“worker”.  
 
The second part of the thesis, chapter three is of a more comparative nature 
and serves to compare and analyse the different methods of interpretation 
applied by the national courts in two of the Member States, (Sweden and 
England) when defining the term “employee” for the purpose of each of the 
Member States’ national unfair dismissal legislation. The national definition 
of the term employee is very important as it assists determining the scope of 
eligibility for an unfair dismissal claim. As shall be seen below the 
techniques employed by the different Member States to determine whether a 
contract of employment exists are relatively similar. There is however no 
guarantee that two identical situations in two different Member States will 
be treated in the same way. The chapter will also discuss to what extent, if at 
all, dissimilar national interpretations of the term employee and hence a 
differing scope of protection can be justified as this will have the potential of 
creating a competitive advantage to companies situated in countries where 
the term employee has been interpreted less widely, and thus offering less 
protection to employees of those Member States which may result in less 
costly dismissals for companies situated in those Member States. 
 
Chapter four is also of a more comparative nature in that it outlines the 
national employment protection legislation relating to business transfers in 
Sweden and the UK, (as affected by the Directive). It seeks to highlight the 
potential results of different national interpretations of specific terms of the 
Directive and specifically considers the harmonizing aim of the Directive as 
well as the Court’s reasoning in Levin27. 
 
The fifth chapter introduces the reader to the CFR and explores the legal 
weight carried by it and in particular the legal relevance of the new term 
“worker” and the fundamental right not be unjustified dismissed, introduced 
by Article 30 of the CFR. 
 
The sixth chapter examines the EU’s competence in the field of 
employment protection and considers potential avenues for further 
expansions into the social field and the limits set by the principle of 
subsidiarity. 
 
The final chapter, chapter seven, presents some of the concerns and thoughts 
that have been raised by academics in respect of this area of law and 
concludes with my own observations, analysis and conclusion. 
 
                                                 
27
 Case 53/81 Levin ECR 1035 [1982] 2 CMLR 454 
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2 EU Employment Law – the 
Development of an area of 
Shared Competence 
2.1 Introduction 
EU’s intervention in the Member State’s national employment laws serves a 
number of objectives which can be divided into three broad categories, 
depending on whether the intervention is justified by an integrationist
28
, 
economic
29
 or social
30
 rationale or a combination of a pair of them. Support 
for each of the rationales can be found in the Preamble to the TEU in which 
the Member States declared themselves: “determined to promote economic 
and social progress for their peoples...within the context of the 
accomplishment of the internal market...” 31 Unlike the economic and social 
rationales, the integrationist rationale is however not pursued as an objective 
in itself but as a means through which an economic or social objective is to 
be realised.
32
 
 
The original objectives of the European Union were primarily the 
economical aspects of the labour market and the Union did not have any 
competence in the social field.
33 This is because the institutions of the 
European Union only have powers and is able to act in those areas where 
power to act has been granted to it by the Member States. Further, in 
accordance with the principle of conferral
 34
 the Union shall act only within 
the limits of the competences conferred upon it and only to achieve the 
objectives set out in the Treaties.
35
 It follows that any measures adopted by 
any of the EU institutions must be founded on a legal basis in the Treaties.  
 
For some time, competence within the social field therefore remained 
exclusively with the Member States and the Union was free to act in 
employment related matters only where they arose in the context of free 
                                                 
28
 The integrationist rationale is concerned with the establishment and the functioning of the 
internal market. As such it affords the EU the opportunity to intervene in domestic 
employment law to the extent that national employment law provisions can be said to 
constitute barriers to free movement and/or distortions of competition.  
29
 The economic rationale is relied on to justify EU intervention for reasons relating to the 
performance of the EU, e.g. growth, reduced unemployment, enhanced efficiency, better 
infrastructure and  improved international competitiveness.  
30
 The social rationale is used to find support for EU interventions which aim to improve 
the position of workers. The social rationale reflects the perceived need to intervene for the 
benefit of workers. 
31
 Syrpis, (2007), p. 4. 
32
 Ibid, p. 51. 
33
 Bruun/Lörcher/Schömann, (2012), p. 1. 
34
 Article 5(1) TEU  
35
 Art 5(2) TEU  
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movement of workers. As shall be seen in the below, the Union’s 
competences have however been gradually extended since the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957, first by the Single European Act
36
and then by the Treaties of 
Maastricht
37
, Amsterdam
38
 and Nice
39
.  
 
In order to fully understand and be able to form an educated opinion about 
where the line between the Member States’ and the Union’s competences 
should be drawn it is essential to understand the context in which European 
labour law has developed and to appreciate the underlying policy aims 
which to a large extent are influenced by political, social and economic 
considerations. It has also been suggested that a close examination of the 
chequered history and development of the EU’s competences in the 
politically sensitive field of EU employment may assist in identifying 
potential ways forward.
40
 
It should be noted that following the Lisbon Treaty, which came into effect 
on 1 December 2009, much of the terminology referred to in the following 
has changed and what was previously referred to as the European 
Community or the EC is therefore now the European Union or simply the 
EU and what was previously known as the common market is now referred 
to as the internal market.  
In the following chapters, even when describing the historical developments 
of the European Union the current terminology has been used although it 
would not have been the terminology used at the time. Where reference is 
made to Treaty provisions I have sometimes referred to both the old and the 
current provisions, placing the latter in brackets. I have done this to limit the 
risk of misunderstanding and to assist the reader gaining a good 
understanding of the social progress, that has taken place since 1957 and 
which European labour law to a large extent has been affected by. 
 
                                                 
36
 The Single European Act was signed on 17 February 1986, and on 28 February 1986 and 
came into effect on 1 July 1987 
37
 The Treaty of Maastricht (formally, the Treaty on European Union or TEU) was signed 
on 7 February 1992 and came into force on 1 November 1993 
38
 The Treaty of Amsterdam (officially the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of 
the European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain 
related acts), was signed on 2 October 1997, and entered into force on 1 May 1999 
39
 The Treaty of Nice was signed on 26 February 2001 and came into force on 1 February 
2003 
40
 Syrpis, (2007), p. 161. 
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2.2 The Treaty of Rome – The 
Establishment of an Internal Market 
2.2.1 The European Economic Community 
The Treaty of Rome
41, (“the EEC Treaty”) created the European Economic 
Community, (“the EEC”) in 1957. The aim of the EEC was the 
establishment of an internal market, (fundamentally an integrationist-
economic project). A customs union was hence established and free 
movement of persons, services, capital and freedom of competition was 
introduced.
42
 The realisation of the internal market was greatly assisted by 
the abolishment of customs duties between the Member States.
43
 Further and 
more importantly for the purposes of this thesis, Article 3(1)(g) EC
44
 
provided that the Union should have exclusive competence in “the 
establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market”.  
 
The social aims of the Union were however largely neglected and although 
the Treaty of Rome did contain a Title on Social Policy, its provisions did 
not confer much in terms of direct rights on citizens. The explanation for this 
was a presiding strong belief that, once artificial obstacles to the free 
movement of labour, goods and capital had been removed, the internal 
market would operate to ensure that the market resources were allocated in 
the most cost efficient way. This in turn would generate economic growth 
and ensure social progress, which was seen as a reward for efficiency. This 
classic neo-liberal market approach was reflected in what is now Article 151 
TFEU which provided that an improvement in working conditions would 
”ensue” from the functioning of the internal market and that social policy, 
employment and labour relations therefore would be determined by market 
mechanisms rather than legislative intervention.
45
   
 
This approach must however be seen in the light of the thriving economic 
climate which characterised Europe at the time. An unprecedented increase 
of social rights being granted at national level did no doubt also play an 
important role together with two influential reports that had been issued in 
1956, one by a committee set up by the Member States, referred to as “the 
Spaak Report” and another by a committee of experts from the International 
                                                 
41
 The Treaty of Rome, (officially the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (“TEEC”), was signed on 25 March 1957 and formed the basis of the European 
Economic Community (“EEC”) on 1 January 1958 
42
 Bruun/Lörcher/Schömann, (2012), p.1. 
43
 Steiner/Woods/Twigg-Flesner, (2006), p. 309. 
44
 Since the Treaty of Lisbon the substantive content of what used to be Article 3(1)(g) EC 
has been transferred to a Protocol (No. 27) on the Internal Market and Competition, 
annexed to the TEU and the TFEU. The constitutional status of the principle of undistorted 
competition has not been altered although it has been questioned since it was removed from 
the Treaty, see Van Rumpoy, Ben, ”The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on EU Competition 
Law: A Review of Recent Case Law of the EU Courts”, 13 December 2011 
45
 Barnard, (2006), p. 4 f. 
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Labour Organization, (“the ILO”), “the Ohlin Report”. Both of these reports 
had suggested that there was no need for an interventionist social dimension 
for the proposed common market, (save for certain measures against “unfair 
competition”). In addition the Member States generally felt that social policy 
and particularly labour law very much were policy areas which should be 
dealt with at national level, being considered vital to preserve the integrity 
and political stability of the Member States’ respective regimes.46 As a result 
the EEC Treaty contained only a minimum of provisions granting the 
institutions of the Union competence to issue coordinating regulations in the 
sphere of the social dimension.
47
 
 
For the development of European labour law this meant that, although the 
Member States were in agreement about the need to improve working 
conditions and living standards in the Union, no significant developments of 
social nature took place over the next coming years except for in the context 
of free movement of workers.
48
 
 
2.2.2 Free Movement as a legal basis for EU 
intervention in the Social Field (and the 
integrationist-economic rationale for the 
EU “worker”) 
Among the original objectives of the EEC was to establish an internal 
market for labour but as already seen, the original Treaty of Rome did not 
grant the Union institutions much authority per se in respect of employment 
related matters.
 49
  What is now Article 45 of the TFEU did however provide 
that: “Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union” 
and in accordance with the second paragraph of the same article, that any 
discrimination between workers of the Member States on the basis of 
nationality should be abolished.  
 
Despite the fact that Article 45 TFEU since the case of Angonese
50
 has been 
held to have direct effect and create rights which are directly enforceable by 
the Union’s citizens, it is important to remember that the overarching aim of 
Article 45 TFEU was economic rather than social. Its primary aim was to 
facilitate for workers from Member States with high unemployment rates to 
seek up employment in other Member States with higher employment rates 
where their skills were better needed as it was believed to lead to increased 
productivity and more equalized employment conditions among competing 
businesses across the Union.
51
  
 
                                                 
46
 Ibid, p. 7 f. 
47
 Bruun/Lörcher/Schömann, (2012), p.1.  
48
 Nyström, (2011), p. 49. 
49
 Bercusson, (2009), p. 31 f. 
50
 Case 281/98 Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139 
51
 Barnard, (2006), p. 7. 
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Since 1957, the concept (and implications) of freedom of movement has 
been developed extensively by the case law of the Court of Justice, as has 
the concept of “worker” itself. It is now widely accepted that this is a Union 
concept and as such entirely independent of the interpretations given to it by 
the courts in the Member States.
52
  The reasoning behind this is a clear 
example of the Court’s support of the integrationist economic rationale and 
it could not have been put clearer:  
 
“If the definition of this term were a matter for the competence of national 
law, it would...be possible for each Member State to modify the meaning of 
the concept of migrant worker and to eliminate at will the protection 
afforded by the Treaty to certain categories of persons…[the Treaty 
Articles] would, therefore be deprived of all effect and the above mentioned 
objectives of the Treaty would be frustrated if the meaning of such a term 
could be unilaterally fixed and modified by national law.” 53 
 
Irrespective of the fact that the concept of free movement of workers 
originated from an economic rather than a social objective, it has had an 
impact on many areas of a social nature. Areas affected by the free 
movement provisions include transfers of pensions and social benefits, 
migrant workers’ entitlements to unemployment benefits, social security, 
family issues of education, housing etc. As social issues came to be dealt 
with under the general economic guidelines of free movement of labour 
rather than as independent social issues, some tension in the balance 
between the economic and social perceptions of free movement of workers 
was unavoidable. It was nevertheless this tension, caused by this overlap of 
EU economic and social policy in the area of free movement, which was the 
driving force behind many developments in EU social policy and has had 
important implications for the regulation of employment and industrial 
relations in the EU.
54
 The Court’s interpretative approach of the term 
“worker” as well as the rationale relied on by the Court in the context of EU 
employment law will be considered further in 2.4. 
 
2.3 The Development of the EU and the 
Expansion of EU Social Law 
In the early 70’s European labour law had attracted considerable interest and 
in October 1972, following a Heads of States meeting in Paris a final 
communiqué was issued.
 55
 The communiqué declared that the Member 
States:  
“...attached as much importance to vigorous action in the social field as to 
the achievement of economic union... (and considered) it essential to ensure 
                                                 
52
 Case 53/81 Levin [1982] ECR 1035  
53
 Case 75/63 Hoekstra [1964] CMLR 319 
54
Bercusson, (2009), p. 32. 
55
 Ibid, p. 108. 
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the increasing involvement of labour and management in the economic and 
social decisions of the [Union]”. 
For the first time, the social dimension was expressed to be just as important 
as the economic dimension.
56
 This radical change in approach has been 
explained by the social turbulence experienced in Western Europe in 1968 
and in part also by the recession which followed from the oil crisis in 1973. 
It had also become apparent that the Union required a human face to 
persuade its citizens that the Union was more than just a device enabling 
businesses to exploit the internal market.
 57
 It is commonly accepted that it 
was economic and political developments within the Union that opened the 
way for the adoption of the path breaking Social Action Programme in 
1974.
58
 
 
2.3.1 The Social Action Programme 1974 
The Social Action Programme of 1974 was the first Social Action 
Programme, launched by the Commission in response to a mandate issued 
by the Heads of States meeting in Paris at the Summit of October 1972.  
The Social Action Programme of 1974 set out to achieve: 
1) full and better employment in the [Union];  
2) improved living and working conditions; and  
3) increased involvement of management and labour in the economic 
and social decisions of the [Union] and of workers in companies.
59
 
As a result, a number of directives were adopted in the field of health and 
safety, providing the Union worker with increased protection. Against the 
threat of rising unemployment, directives in the field of employment were 
also issued to ease the impact of future mass redundancies. As there were no 
Treaty provisions granting the Union explicit competence in this area, the 
directives dealing with collective redundancies, transfers of undertakings, 
equal pay and equal treatment were adopted on the basis that they were 
necessary to achieve fair competition in the internal market. The competence 
relied upon to adopt the above mentioned directives therefore derived from 
the Treaty provisions concerned with “the establishment or functioning of 
the internal market”, (now Article 115 TFEU).  
Nyström has explained the development during this period as a reflection of 
a general welfare expansion that took place in Western Europe around this 
time.
60
 Bercusson has also pointed to the strong political influence exercised 
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by the Social Democrats in Germany who were committed supporters of 
social progress in the employment field. The reason for this support appears 
to have been to undercut the concerns raised from German employers that 
proposed domestic legislation would reduce the competitiveness of German 
industry. Strengthened protection for the Union worker compatible with 
national German employment law was also seen as desirable as it would 
eliminate the incentive for employers to shift their investments from 
Germany to other European Member States.
61
 In this context it should 
however be noted that it was only in the field of the equality directives that 
the level of protection came to be extended to the Union worker. In respect 
of the other directives and notably the Acquired Rights Directive, (which I 
shall revert to in this regard), the harmonisation was only partial.  
As put by a former Commissioner for Social Affairs, the Social Action 
Programme of 1974”...reflected a political judgment of what was thought to 
be both desirable and possible rather than juridical judgment of what were 
thought to be the social policy implications of the Rome Treaty”.62 
 
2.3.2 “Harmonisation” 
“Harmonisation” was the name of the social policy strategy which rather 
ingeniously was adopted by the EU in the first Social Action Programme of 
1974. As the EEC Treaty of 1957 did not provide the necessary legal 
competences for the EU to intervene in the social field, any social policy 
measures had to be justified as measurements contributing to the internal 
market.
63
 Both the directive on Collective Redundancies
64
 and the Acquired 
Rights Directive
65
, were adopted on this basis, (although the extent of their 
harmonising effect has been questioned.)
66
 A third directive
67
 which 
provided the employees with additional protection in the event of the 
employer’s insolvency was also adopted. 
The strategy of harmonisation did however bring the relation between EU 
law and social and labour policy into sharp focus. Over all, it became clear 
that the incorporation of industrial relations and collective bargaining needed 
to be taken into account in any further attempts of harmonisation. This was 
because different national industrial relations systems in combination with 
differing formal labour laws often give rise to different practical applications 
of national laws.
68
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The two alternative scenarios that the strategy of harmonisation is likely to 
produce are, according to Bercusson: 
 
1) Formal Harmonisation 
 
Where similar labour laws are invoked, their effects on different industrial 
relations systems give rise to variable results. This is often the case in the 
case of nationally implemented EU directives which at a first glance may 
appear very similar and address common sets of problems. It is also mirrored 
in the formal successes of harmonisation policy (e.g. the same directives 
applied in all Member States), but in the variable consequences in practice of 
this formal success. Bercusson refers to this as “formal harmonisation”.69 An 
example of this problem can be seen in the discussion of the problems 
arising from different national definitions of “pressing business reasons”, a 
concept developed to justify dismissals under a draft of the Acquired Rights 
Directive. Although the Commission acknowledged the “elastic definition of 
this concept” it refused to define it. This approach was much criticised by 
the European Parliament as it meant that the interpretation of the concept 
was left to the courts of each of the Member States. Rather interestingly, the 
Commission, in a later report to the Council regarding legislation concerning 
individual dismissals, did however conclude that “...all Member States 
would appear to accept that a reduction in the volume of business or the 
introduction of rationalisation measures, that is economic grounds, are 
sufficient justification for dismissal”.70  
 
2) Substantive Harmonisation 
 
The Member States’ labour laws are often different precisely because of the 
differences in their national industrial relations systems. Different industrial 
relations systems mean that the national labour laws invoked to deal with a 
particular problem are different by way of necessity. Bercusson refers to this 
as “substantive harmonisation”.71 In order to achieve substantive 
harmonisation in the field of national labour laws, Member States may 
require different laws to be adopted to accommodate their different national 
environments. In view of the lack of specific EU competence in the field of 
employment law it is perhaps not surprising that this has been the major 
obstacle at which progress towards harmonisation as a legal policy of the 
Union has been halted.
72
 
It was not until the EU gained some competences in the field of employment 
and industrial relations, first in the Single European Act 1986 and then the 
Treaty of Maastricht 1992, that Union social initiatives could be adopted 
without the need to justify them in terms of harmonisation of laws directly 
affecting the internal market.  
                                                 
69
 Ibid, p. 112. 
70
 EIRR, No.5 (May 1974), p. 9 at p.13 and No. 13 (January 1975), p. 6. 
71
 Bercusson, (2009), p. 113. 
72
 Ibid, p. 110. 
 24 
“Harmonisation” does however still appear in the context of EU employment 
and industrial relations as an EU objective, originally stipulated in Article 
117 of the EEC Treaty of 1957, (now in Article 151 TFEU): 
“The Union and the Member States, (…) shall have as their objectives the 
promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to 
make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being 
maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between management and 
labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high 
employment and the combating of exclusion.” 
 
2.3.3 UK Deregulation Policy and formal 
recognition of the Social Dialouge 
2.3.3.1 UK Deregulation Policy 
From 1979 the UK government, led by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
party, operated a domestic deregulation strategy. The aim of the UK 
Conservative government’s strategy was to remove institutions of labour 
market regulation and reduce legal intervention in the relationships between 
employers and individual employees to a minimum. The UK government’s 
deregulation strategy aimed to remove not only regulations derived from 
state intervention, but also those that resulted from the activities of 
collective organisations of labour and trade unions.
73
  
 
In view of the above it is therefore rather ironic that the UK’s blockage of 
EU labour legislation is exactly what appears to have provided the critical 
impetus to a transformation in the EU’s legal strategy for social policy and 
labour law.
74
 
 
2.3.3.2 The Social Dialouge 
In 1985, at the initiative of Jacques Delors, the President of the 
Commission, the Social Partners
75
 were invited to the castle of Val 
Duchesse to discuss how the social dialogue could be advanced. 
76
 In an 
article from 1985, it was observed that: 
“The Commission has adopted a unique approach to further its employment 
law agenda. It has not only maintained regular contact with the 
representatives of workers and employers, but has actively encouraged the 
development of Union level worker and employer organizations. It has done 
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so by offering such groups the opportunity to engage in extensive 
negotiations on all Union employment proposals.”77 
The attitudes of the Social Partners towards the Social Dialogue need to be 
considered in the context of the 1992 Single European Market Programme 
(launched by Delors in 1985). The objective of the single market (proposed 
by Delors’ 1992 Single European Market Programme), would come to have 
serious implications for employment and industrial relations in the EU. In 
particular, the creation of the single market posed a genuine threat in the 
form of competition between enterprises in different Member States who 
were faced with different direct and indirect labour costs and different 
systems of social and labour regulation.
78
 Labour costs have been assessed 
to account for some two-thirds of the production costs of goods and 
services
79
 and it is therefore not surprising that the single market led to 
concerns that companies in Member States with lower labour and social 
standards would gain a competitive advantage over companies based in 
Member States where labour costs were higher, raising the threat of what 
has been labelled “social dumping” or “social regime competition”. This 
inevitably meant a fierce and protracted battle between the Social Partners 
over the political and legal strategies to be adopted to best deal with the 
predicted effects of the single market.
80
 
 
2.3.3.3 Deregulation – v – EU Social Policy jurisdiction 
The strategy adopted by the trade unions has been described as dictated by a 
“political-distributive” reasoning which recognised the risks posed by social 
dumping in the Single European Market, but which also acknowledged the 
advantages to be reaped by companies free to compete without national 
barriers. The aim of the trade unions was to strike a balance between the 
costs of the social protection (which were deemed necessary to offset the 
risk of social dumping) and the losses to the companies which would occur 
by this necessary degree of regulation. The “political-distributive” strategy 
was therefore in large directed towards labour and social standards 
regulation at European level which was considered to be the best way 
forward to secure the fair distribution of the benefits of the Single European 
Market. 
 
As expected, the strategy adopted by the employer organisations was 
characterised by an “economic-productive” way of thinking. For companies 
in the EU, the principal competitive challenge came from outside the EU, 
primarily the USA and Japan. Companies in those countries benefited from 
significantly lower social and labour standards, a competitive advantage 
creating an obstacle for companies in the EU. Any social policy adopted in 
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the new Single European Market should therefore, through deregulation, 
focus on reducing this competitive advantage by eliminating social and 
labour regulation burdening companies in the EU.
81
 
 
Each of these social policy strategies were accompanied by a legal strategy. 
The “political-distributive” strategy advanced by the trade unions envisaged 
a transfer of the social policy jurisdiction to the EU. The advantage of 
“harmonised” social and labour standards throughout the EU were the 
equalisation of indirect labour costs for all companies in the EU which 
would reduce, if not entirely eliminate, the danger of unequal labour and 
social standards distorting competition in favour of Member states with 
lower labour and social standards.
82
 The deregulation strategy put forward 
by the employer organisations was based on the assumption that no common 
social and labour standards would be imposed through EU measures.
83
 The 
Member States would retain the competence over the social and labour 
standards, accepting that there would be an element of direct competition 
between the Member States social policy regimes.
84
 The employer 
organisations advocated that this approach would reduce the need for central 
regulatory bureaucracy. The deregulation strategy also had an additional 
attraction to the employers as it meant that social regulation initiatives at 
national level were likely to be held back for fear of burdening Member 
State companies. In conclusion, the deregulatory social policy strategy 
favoured by the employer organisations opened up for the risks of a 
regulatory social regime competition in which Member States would 
compete against each other to lower indirect social and labour costs
85
 and“a 
race to the bottom“ scenario.86 
 
Bercusson also makes the interesting point that both of the above strategies, 
despite their obvious differences, resulted in an outcome which meant that 
the Member States’ autonomy in the field of social policy became reduced. 
Whilst it is inevitable that the first “political-distributive” strategy entailing 
a transfer of the social policy jurisdiction to the EU would result in a loss of 
the Member States’ autonomy in the social field, Bercusson’s reasons for 
arguing that the second “economic-productive” strategy favoured by the 
employers’ organisations would produce a similar outcome are perhaps less 
obvious. However, Bercusson suggests that due to the fact that the Member 
States will be very mindful of any increased labour cost implications that 
social initiatives will have on companies on their national territory, the 
autonomy that the Member States on the face of it will appear to have 
retained, will indirectly, through political pressure be reduced if not 
eliminated altogether. In addition, the pressure for further deregulation 
would continue.
87
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2.3.3.4 Qualified Majority Voting through the Single 
European Act 1986 
The Single European Act (“the SEA”) came into force on 1 July 1987. It 
signalled a new drive for European integration. The Commission’s proposal 
of the Single European Market Programme in 1985 implied the approval of a 
large number of directives aimed at eliminating the many obstacles 
identified. To achieve the approval of these directives, the SEA derogated 
from the requirement of unanimity laid down in the then Article 100 EEC 
(now Article 115 TFEU) by adding to the EEC Treaty a new Article 100A 
EEC (now Article 114 TFEU) to allow for qualified majority voting. 
However, at the insistence of the UK government, fearful of being outvoted 
on new social policy initiatives which it categorically opposed to, there was 
inserted a second paragraph into the new Article 100A EEC (now Article 
114(2) TFEU):  
“Paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to the 
free movement of persons nor to those relating to the rights and interests of 
employed persons”.  
The purpose of the insertion of the second paragraph was unambiguous. 
However, as part of the compromise made with the UK, (which prevented 
proposals “relating to the rights and interests of employed persons” from 
being adopted through qualified majority voting), a new Article 118A (now 
Article 153 TFEU) was inserted by the SEA, specifically stipulating that the 
qualified majority voting process could be used for proposals “encouraging 
improvements, especially in the working environment, as regards the health 
and safety of workers”. 
The significance of the new legal basis adopted by the SEA in respect of EU 
policy on employment and industrial relations did soon become clear. The 
Commission’s 1989 Social Action Programme had highlighted the issue of 
working time. Rather than relying on what is now Article 114 TFEU (which 
would have allowed for approval by qualified majority voting) as its legal 
basis, the Commission decided to rely on Article 153 TFEU and argued that 
the diversity of regulatory practices in the Member States regarding 
flexibility of working time posed a potential threat to the well-being and 
health of workers. The Commission’s choice of legal basis was deliberate as 
it, by avoiding Article 114 TFEU, was able to avoid the question of whether 
the proposal should be excluded from the qualified majority voting regime. 
As a consequence, a heated debate over what would fall under the heading 
“working environment” and “health and safety of workers” commenced.88 
The UK’s challenge before the Court of Justice regarding the Commission’s 
choice of a legal basis for the Working Time directive, subsequently 
adopted by the Council, was however  unsuccessful.
89
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2.3.4 The Treaty of Maastricht 1992 and the 
Agreement on Social Policy – extending 
the EU’s competence 
Following a period defined by deregulation the next real breakthrough in the 
social field came with the Treaty of Maastricht.  
 
The protracted debate over the future of social policy in the EU (which 
involved not only the Social Partners but also the EU institutions) has been 
characterised by two important developments: 
 
1) the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 
1989 (“the Charter”); and  
 
2) the Protocol and the Agreement on Social Policy of the Treaty on 
European Union (“the Social Policy Protocol”).90 
 
2.3.4.1 The Community Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights of Workers 1989 
The adoption of the Charter has been described as a “powerful signal” that 
the Member States were committed to support the development of a 
common set of social policy and labour law objectives. This stimulated a 
move towards an expansion of social and labour competences at EU level 
which in turn also came to have a positive impact on the development of the 
Social Dialogue.
91
Article 28 of the Charter stipulated that:  
 
“The European Council invites the Commission to submit as soon as 
possible initiatives which fall within its powers, as provided for in the 
Treaties, with a view to the adoption of legal instruments for the effective 
implementation, as and when the internal market is completed, of those 
rights, which come within the [Union]’s area of competence.” 
 
Although the UK government’s opposition meant that the Charter could not 
be integrated into the Treaty of Rome its legal status of a political 
declaration was frequently cited in the preambles to measures proposed by 
the Commission as well as in the preamble to the Social Policy Protocol and 
the Agreement on Social Policy. Despite its merely declaratory character 
and the opposition of the UK government, the Charter was therefore not 
insignificant in terms of the launching of future employment and industrial 
relations policy initiatives.
92
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2.3.4.2 The Agreement on Social Policy and the Social 
Policy Protocol 
The Treaty of Maastricht included a Protocol incorporating an Agreement 
on Social Policy, (the result of negotiations between the Social Partners). 
The Agreement on Social Policy was adopted by all of the Member States, 
(with the exception of the UK). Through the Treaty of Maastricht the social 
competences of the Union therefore came to be extended as the Agreement 
not only introduced a new and extended scope of Union social policy which 
went beyond the Union’s previous competence but, (as seen above), also 
directed the Commission to prepare proposals for the new competences to 
be implemented.
93
 
 
2.3.4.2.1 The Agreement on Social Policy 
The Agreement on Social Policy also provided the first substantial legal 
basis for EU legislation in the fields of employment and industrial relations 
by authorising the Council to proceed by qualified majority voting to adopt, 
by means of directives, minimum requirements for gradual implementation 
in the following fields: 
1) improvement of the working environment to protect worker’s health 
an safety;  
2) working conditions;  
3) the information and consultation of workers;  
4) equality between men and women with regard to labour market 
opportunities and treatment at work; and 
5) the integration of persons excluded from the labour market. 
Unanimity would however still be required in the areas listed below 
and notably also in respect of employment protection of workers, an 
area that the Commission (in view of the effects that different levels 
of national dismissal protection systems was seen to have on creating 
varying indirect wage costs between the companies in the Member 
States), had suggested should be the subject of harmonisation: 
6) social security and social protection of workers;  
7) protection of workers where their employment is terminated;  
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8) representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and 
employers, including co-determination, subject to what is now 
Article 153 (5) TFEU;  
9) conditions of employment for third country nationals legally residing 
in Union territory; and  
10) financial contributions for promotion of employment and job 
creation.
94
 
 
2.3.4.2.2 The Social Policy Protocol 
At the Maastricht summit in December 1991, the then 12 Member States of 
the European Union were unable to agree on the future direction of social 
policy in the new European Union. As unanimity was required for the 
Maastricht Treaty to be adopted the Social Policy Protocol was the legal 
mechanism adopted to resolve the deadlock situation reached over the social 
policy provisions of a new Social Chapter of the EC Treaty (which reflected 
the Agreement on Social Policy reached by the Social Partners in October 
1991).
95
 
 
As the UK government refused to be bound by the Agreement on Social 
Policy, the Social Policy Protocol to the Treaty of Maastricht included a 
compromise in the form of an “opt-out” in favour of the UK. Between 1992 
-1997 a “two speed” Europe in the sphere of employment and industrial 
relations therefore came to exist.
96
 
 
In accordance with the procedures of the Protocol and the Agreement on 
Social Policy, the directives on European Works Councils
97
, parental 
leave
98
and part-time work
99
 did not get the approval by all of the Member 
States until May 1997 when the newly elected UK labour government 
decided to terminate the “opt-out”. The Treaty of Amsterdam of June 1997 
deleted the Social Policy Protocol and incorporated the Agreement on 
Social Policy into a revised “Social Chapter” of the EC Treaty.100 
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2.3.5 The Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
Employment Title, the European 
Employment Strategy and the Open 
Method of Coordination 
Towards the end of the 1990’s the Single Market for goods, services and 
capital was well established. The Single Market for labour was however far 
from completed and in large the labour markets of the Member States’ had 
remained national.
101
 Already in the Commission’s White Paper from 
1993
102
 Delors had highlighted employment as one of the most important 
areas of concern and with increasing unemployment problems facing the EU 
a new Title on Employment was incorporated into the EC Treaty by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.
103
 The introduction of the Employment Title 
can also be seen as a reaction to the EU’s economic integration in the 
1990’s. As many of the Member States were reluctant to delegate further 
powers to the European institutions viable alternatives needed to be 
considered. 
 
2.3.5.1 The Employment Title and the European 
Employment Strategy 
The Employment Title, (now comprising of Articles 145-150 TFEU) was 
largely the result of pressure from France and the Scandinavian countries 
and committed the Member States and the Union to work towards 
“...developing a coordinated strategy for employment and particularly for 
promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and labour markets 
responsive to economic change...” with a view to achieving a competitive 
social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress.
104
 
Barnard has also claimed that the inclusion of the Employment Title can be 
interpreted as increased awareness of the interdependency that the effects of 
the EMU had brought to the participating Member States’ economies.105 
 
Article 148 TFEU sets out the specific process for implementing the 
European Employment Strategy (“the EES”). The EES was designed as the 
main tool to help ensure that Member States were able to achieve the EU 
level employment policy priorities. This co-ordination of employment 
policies at EU level is built around several components: 
 
1) A Joint Employment Report: the various National Action Plans are 
reviewed and brought together into an EU-wide Joint Employment 
Report and the employment guidelines are revised as required;  
                                                 
101
 Bercusson, (2009), p. 168. 
102
 White Paper: ”Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Ways 
Forward into the 21st Century”, 1993 
103
 Bercusson, (2009), p. 168. 
104
 Barnard, (2006), p. 24. 
105
 Ibid, p. 25. 
 32 
2) Employment guidelines: a series of EU guidelines are agreed every 
year which set out the common priorities for Member States’ 
employment policies;  
3) National Action Plans: every Member State draws up an annual 
National Action Plan that describes how the guidelines are to be put 
into practice in their country; and 
4) Recommendations: the EU issues country-specific recommendations 
on how to implement the employment guidelines.
106
 
 
The EES aims to develop a social dimension to the activities of the EU. As 
such, it represents a major development in the implementation of EU social 
policies. The EES does not cover all policies that are related to employment. 
Important areas that concern economic and employment growth in the 
European Union, such as monetary, fiscal and wage policy, are not included. 
Nonetheless, the EES has contributed in a variety of different ways to the re-
conceptualisation of EU social policy and to the strengthening of the 
“European social model”. In particular, the Open Method of Coordination, 
which has become known as the “Luxembourg process” brought 
employment to the forefront of the European and national debate.
107
  
 
The Employment Title is usually characterised as a typical ”soft-law” 
coordination measure as although it requires the Member States to engage in 
the field of employment policy, it does not confer any competences on the 
EU to regulate the national labour markets.
108
 
 
2.3.5.2 The Open Method of Coordination 
The Employment Title of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, originally introduced by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, is perceived 
as the original model of the Open Method of Coordination (“the OMC”). 
Employment policy has been described as the paradigm case of the OMC 
with an annual report resulting in guidelines, which the Member States 
“shall take into account in their employment policies”109, followed by an 
annual report on national employment policy and reviewed in a report by the 
Council and Commission upon which the European Council may make 
(non-binding) recommendations to Member States.
110
 
 
It is a policymaking process which does not lead to binding EU legislative 
measures nor require the Member States to change their laws. It simply aims 
to spread best practices and achieve greater convergence towards the main 
EU goals.
111
  
 
                                                 
106
 http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=101&langId=en  
107
 Bercusson, (2009), p. 170. 
108
 Ibid, p. 187. 
109
 Now Article 148(2) TFEU 
110
 Bercusson, (2009), p. 173. 
111
 Barnard, (2006), p. 141. 
 33 
The “Lisbon Strategy” from 2000 set out for the EU “to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy in the world capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion”. In its Social Policy Agenda 2000-2005 the Commission made it 
clear that it did not seek to achieve the goals of the Lisbon Strategy through 
harmonisation of social policy and emphasised its reliance on the process of 
the OMC to achieve its ambitious aims.
112
 
 
2.3.6 The Treaty of Nice and the Laeken 
Declaration 
To a large extent, the Treaty of Nice of December 2000 focused on the 
enlargement of the Community by the accession of new Member States, 
with much attention being directed to questions concerning the composition 
of the Commission (increase in numbers to take account of the acceding 
countries) and the weighting of votes (mainly in favour of larger Member 
States) and voting procedures in the Council of Ministers (significant 
extension of qualified majority voting to many policy areas which 
previously required unanimity).
113
  
 
There was however one important change to the qualified majority voting 
procedure which had an impact on the field of employment and industrial 
relations. Through a new provision (now Article 153(2) TFEU), the 
Council, on a proposal from the Commission was now able to authorise 
qualified majority voting in three cases where unanimity previously had 
been the rule. It should be noted that this now also covers the scenario of 
“protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated”.114  
 
The Charter, which contained central employment rights, was also formally 
adopted as a political declaration, (although it did not become legally 
binding until the Treaty of Lisbon).
115
 The Charter represented a significant 
contribution to the promotion of rights on employment and industrial 
relations in the EU. As an independent source of rights not limited to 
national practice in individual Member States the Charter broke new ground 
by including in a single list of fundamental rights, not only traditional civil 
and political rights, but also social and economic rights, proving that these 
latter rights are recognised as having the same status as civil and political 
rights. In addition, the Charter also put pressure on EU institutions to 
promote a European social model.
116
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One year after the Treaty of Nice, when the European Council met in 
Laeken, a fresh declaration was adopted.
117
 The “Laeken Declaration” 
consisted of more than 64 issues regarding the future development and 
enlargement of the Union which the Convention on the Future of Europe 
headed by the former French President, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing would 
consider.  
 
The Laeken Declaration focused on four main themes: 
 
1) A more precise division and delimitation of competences between 
the EU and the Member States in accordance with subsidiarity; 
 
2) The status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was 
“proclaimed” at Nice; 
 
3) A simplification of the Treaties to make them clearer and more 
accessible without affecting their meaning; and 
 
4) The role of national Parliaments in the European architecture. 
 
Special working groups were established to deal with certain areas such as 
the subsidiarity principle, the Charter, the division of competences between 
the EU and the Member States and Social Europe.
118
 The Working Group
119
 
concerned with the Charter recommended that it was integrated into the 
draft Constitutional Treaty.
120
 
 
2.3.7 The Treaty of Lisbon and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights 
The Treaty of Lisbon came into force on 1 December 2009 after many years 
of institutional impasse since the failed referenda on the Constitutional 
Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005. The three pillar structure has 
now been abolished and with it also the European Community which was 
replaced by the European Union.
121
 
 
Despite the idea of a European Constitution having been abandoned, the 
Treaty of Lisbon was still largely inspired by the Constitutional Treaty with 
the majority of the institutional and policy reforms envisaged in the 
Constitution still to be found in the Treaty of Lisbon. As a result the EU is 
still based on two founding Treaties: the Treaty on the European Union 
(“the TEU”) and the Treaty establishing the European Community. The 
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latter Treaty has however been renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
EU (“the TFEU”).  
 
The new Art 3(3) TEU describes the internal market objectives as follows: 
 
“The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the 
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth 
and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at 
full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific 
and technological advance. It shall combat social exclusion and 
discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality 
between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of 
the rights of the child. It shall promote economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, and solidarity among Member States. It shall respect its rich 
cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's cultural 
heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.” 
 
It should be noted that the reference to the internal market, is no longer, as it 
was under the Constitution, accompanied by the words “...where 
competition is free and undistorted”. Instead this wording has been moved 
into a protocol on the internal market and competition.
122
 As protocols, 
through Article 51 TEU are afforded equal legal weight to the Treaties this 
is perhaps of less significance.
123
 However, taken together with the other 
changes which the Treaty of Lisbon has made to the existing statements of 
the values and aims and objectives of the Union, it has been suggested that a 
change in emphasis towards the social may be detected.
124
 Nyström has 
however questioned whether the reference made to the Union as a social 
market economy carries much weight and has queried the difference 
between a “social market economy” and a simple “market economy”.125 
 
Article 3(6) TEU further stipulates that the Union shall pursue its objectives 
by appropriate means commensurate with the competences conferred upon it 
by the Treaties. For the first time, a precise classification distinguishing 
between three main types of competences can now be found in Articles 2-6 
of the TFEU:  
 
1) Exclusive competences;  
 
2) Shared competences; and 
 
3) Supporting competences. 
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The new systematisation in the Treaties between the EU’s and the Member 
States’ competences did not set out to transfer any additional competences 
to either the EU or to the Member States and as previously, the area of 
employment law does now fall within the category shared competences.
126
 
In accordance with Article 5(2) TFEU, the Union shall take “measures” to 
ensure coordination of the employment policies of the Member States by 
defining guidelines for these policies. These “measures” would appear to 
refer to the use of the OMC process referred to in 2.3.5. As before, the 
Union may also take initiatives to ensure coordination of Member States’ 
social policies.
127
 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon also meant that the CFR became legally binding. 
Article 6 of the Treaty states that the Union recognises the rights, freedoms 
and principles set out in the CFR and that it shall have the same legal value 
as the Treaties.
128
 Through the CFR, several employment rights and notably 
the right to protection against unjustified dismissal in Article 30 CFR was 
recognised as a legally binding fundamental right. 
 
Through the use of a protocol added to the Treaty, the UK and Poland 
sought to ensure that the CFR would not create any rights enforceable in 
Poland or the UK. Unsurprisingly, the British government had particular 
reservations with regard to the social and labour rights of Title IV.
129
 The 
protocol therefore states that the CFR creates no new rights, enforceable in 
the UK, over and above those already provided for in national law.
130
 
Despite the fact that Article 6(1) TEU also provides that the provisions of 
the CFR shall not operate to extend the competences of the EU as defined in 
the Treaties there has been some debate about how this will work in practice 
and whether it will be open to legal challenge on the grounds that it violates 
a principle that EU law must be applied uniformly to all Member States.
131
 
 
The extent of the EU’s competences in the field of employment law and 
unfair dismissal as well as the question whether the CFR is capable of 
creating additional universally applicable EU employment rights, (including 
an autonomous right for the CFR “worker” not to be “unjustified 
dismissed”) will be further explored in chapters 5 and 6.  
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2.4 The Rationale for the EU concept 
“worker” today – a discussion 
Earlier in this chapter, it has been seen how political developments in the 
EU opened up for several directives being adopted in areas such as equality 
and health and safety as well as in relation to employment protection. It has 
also been seen that the EU’s competence to act in the field of employment 
law and employment protection is not uncontroversial. 
 
In accordance with the integrationist approach, the EU initially only 
intervened in the Member States’ domestic regulations of employment law 
where it considered it necessary to do so to prevent distortion of competition 
in the internal market. As a result of the ongoing tension between the 
Union’s economic and social aims, EU employment law did however 
continue to develop. By refusing to accept Member State definitions 
limiting the definition of “worker” (in the context of free movement) to 
“employees” with a contract of employment the Court of Justice played an 
important role in developing the concept of “worker” to a universal wide 
and purposive Union concept, capable of conferring individual EU 
employment rights on anyone engaged in economic activity, to even include 
those who are seeking work.
132
  
 
It is undisputed that the extensive interpretation developed by the Court of 
Justice in respect of the term “worker” initially was influenced by economic 
rather than social considerations. I have already mentioned that the rationale 
behind the Court of Justice’s purposive interpretative approach appears to 
have been to ensure that the supply of workers (or the lack of supply) did 
not jeopardize the realisation of the internal market. To facilitate and 
encourage workers from one Member State to move to another to take up 
employment it was however recognised that certain social rights had to be 
provided for. This did nevertheless mean that the social rights conferred on 
the EU workers initially were, (although sometimes perhaps not in a direct 
way), justified by economic and internal market concerns.  
 
In the case of Levin
133
 the Court considered whether the right of free 
movement conferred on “workers” under Article 45 TFEU was subject to 
the income generated from the work in question being above the minimum 
amount required for subsistence. On the basis of a predominantly 
integrationist-economic rationale, the Court reasoned that: “...the 
achievement of the objectives of the Treaty would be jeopardized if the 
enjoyment of rights conferred by the principle of freedom of movement for 
workers were reserved solely to persons engaged in full-time 
employment...” The Court explained that as long as the work was effective 
and genuine, (as opposed to marginal or ancillary), it was necessary to 
conclude that the term worker had a Union meaning as “…if that was not 
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the case, the [Union] rules on free movement for workers would be 
frustrated, since the meaning of the term could be decided upon and 
modified unilaterally, without any control by the [Union] institutions, by the 
Member States, which would thus be able to exclude at will certain 
categories of persons from the benefit of the Treaty.”   
The integrationist rationale was also relied on in the case of Defrenne
134
 
where the Court of Justice interpreted ex-Article 119 EEC (now Article 157 
TFEU) as having an economic as well as a social objective. In that case the 
Court justified the social objective of equal pay between men and women by 
internal market considerations by making reference to social dumping 
concerns, stating that the aim of ex-Article 119 EEC was to avoid a situation 
where employers in Member States with higher social standards (where the 
principle of equal pay had been implemented) would suffer a competitive 
disadvantage compared to employers in Member States whose social 
legislation did not eliminate discrimination against women workers in 
respect of wages. The Court also found some further support for the social 
objective of Article 157 TFEU in ex-Article 117 EEC (now Article 151 
TFEU) which by its insertion into the body of the Treaty devoted to social 
policy (positioned before ex-Article 119 EEC) gave emphasis to“...the need 
to promote improved working conditions and an improved standard of living 
for workers, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the 
improvement is being maintained”.  
In the case of Shröder
135
 the Court subsequently concluded that the 
economic aim pursued by Article 157 TFEU, (i.e. the elimination of 
distortions of competition between companies established in different 
Member States), was secondary to the social aim pursued by the same 
provision, that equality between men and women and the principle of equal 
pay constituted the expression of a fundamental human right and principles 
protected by the legal order of the Union. In view of the Court’s change of 
emphasis towards the social objective of Article 157 TFEU it is interesting 
to note that the Court in Allonby
136
 took the view that the term “worker” in 
Article 157 TFEU “...having regard to its context and to the objectives of the 
Treaty” felt that a Union definition would be required. A Union definition of 
the term had previously been justified with reference to an economic-
integrationist rationale – not a social-integrationist one. In addition, the 
Court stated that the provisions of UK law which provided that only 
“employees” could join the pension scheme would be incompatible with 
Article 157 TFEU and should be disapplied if their application was such that 
it adversely affected more women than men.  
 
Whilst the Court’s approach to the Union concept of “worker” in Levin can 
be explained by reference to an integrationist-economic rationale, the 
Court’s reasoning in Allonby is less obvious unless it is to be understood as 
if fundamental rights require a universal and uniform application.  
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In its Green Paper “Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 
21
st
 century”137 the Commission noted that outside the specific context of 
freedom of movement of workers and Article 45 TFEU, EU employment 
law often leaves the definition of “worker” to the individual Member 
States.
138
 For example, the Acquired Rights Directive defines “employee” 
as: “any person, whom, in the Member State concerned, is protected as an 
employee under national employment law”.  
 
In view of the term “employee” being a national concept and of a more 
limited scope it is not difficult to see how it will clash with the EU’s labour 
market policies and regulations aimed to include workers who are not 
necessarily “employees”. This was the reason why, in the wider policy goal 
of creating an internal market and securing free movement for workers, the 
Court refused to accept different national concepts which sought to apply 
the term “worker” only to those working under a contract of employment.139  
 
With the evolution of EU employment law and in particular the extensive 
and uniform interpretation that the Court of Justice has given the Union 
term “worker” in mind, I shall in the following chapters 3 and 4 now turn to 
consider the interpretation given to the term “employee” in Sweden and 
England in the context of their national regulations of unfair dismissal, 
including the extended protection against dismissal afforded by the 
Acquired Rights Directive. 
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3 The Concept of Unfair 
Dismissal in Sweden and 
England and national 
definitions of the term 
“Employee” 
3.1 Introduction 
Employment protection legislation will invariably exclude some groups of 
workers from its scope. In the majority of the EU’s Member States self-
employed people, maritime workers, domestic workers, family members 
working in a family business, diplomats, political office-holders, 
entertainers, sportspeople, police and civil servants will be excluded from 
the rules of national employment protection legislation alternatively be 
subject to less generous rules for hiring and firing compared to the general 
workforce. Some countries also have exemptions or alternative regulations 
for particular industries. Sometimes additional exemptions are also made for 
certain groups of workers (or firms) in order to create further employment 
opportunities.
140
  
 
In cases of unfair dismissal, which is a national concept existing in both 
Sweden and England, (and in the EU’s other Member States), the term 
“employee” is often used to determine which workers who are eligible to 
make a claim for unfair dismissal. Only workers who fit the definition of the 
term “employee” will enjoy protection from being unfairly dismissed.  
 
This poses a question, if the term “employee” is defined differently in 
different Member States and in each Member States’ national employment 
protection legislation, could this not (combined with other country specific 
factors having an impact on costs) have the effect of incentivising 
multinational companies to establish themselves in countries where the 
employment protection legislation is less extensive and thereby also less 
costly to comply with for a multinational employer?  
 
In most countries, the concept of an open-ended full time contract of 
employment is not defined explicitly in legislation. Instead, it is a concept 
developed through case law and legal writing. In a comparative study for the 
European Commission Zeijen states:  
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“The conventional elements in the definition of contract of employment 
common to all Member States are: agreement; work performance, length of 
time, remuneration and, most importantly, dependency, subordination and 
control. The latter issues are the subject of increasingly flexible 
interpretation by the courts. In general it appears that the legal concept of 
contract of employment in continental Member States is broader and more 
comprehensive than that in Ireland and the United Kingdom... In the United 
Kingdom for instance, one third of those in employment – such as “casual” 
workers and temporary workers supplied through an agent – is excluded 
from statutory employment rights”.141  
 
As illustrated by the cases of Massam Dzodzi
142
 and Volker
143
, (cases where 
a Member State’s own nationals claimed that they were victims of indirect 
discrimination in their own countries) the Union provisions governing the 
free movement of workers does not apply to purely internal situations of a 
Member State. In the above mentioned cases the Court said that it therefore 
follows that a national who never has exercised the right to move freely 
within the Union is prevented from relying on Article 45 TFEU and the 
Court of Justice’s interpretation of “worker” when their circumstances 
relates to a wholly internal employment matter.
 144
 In any event the 
protection offered to workers (in the context of free movement) is far from 
adequate to substitute the Member States’ national laws relating to unfair 
dismissal protection, and indeed,  were never designed with this as its 
objective either. 
 
National laws and national definitions of employees and workers are 
therefore being applied by the national courts in establishing employment 
rights when the situation in question lacks the required union element. 
However, the extent to which employment protection is provided to different 
categories of employees and self-employed workers varies between the 
different Member States. The scope of protection offered to each category is 
further clouded by differences in legal definitions of who falls within the 
definition of being an employee. Various thresholds as to length of service 
and certain qualifications also serve to exclude some categories of atypical 
workers such as temporary and agency workers from full employment 
protection enjoyed by the average full time employee.
145
  
 
Any significant differences in the employment protection legislation 
between the EU’s Member States can therefore clearly operate to create 
competitive advantages to companies operating in those Member States 
where the employment protection legislation is less burdensome on the 
employer.  
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The aim of this chapter is however not to provide an exhaustive comparison 
and analyse all potential dissimilarities that exists in respect of the 
employment protection between the EU’s Member States. Instead it is 
designed to give the reader an example of an area of employment law where 
the Member States have retained full competence and the EU therefore so far 
has had no or very little impact on the Member States’ employment 
protection legislation.  
 
Accordingly the purpose of this chapter is limited to provide an overview of 
the characteristics of the current regulation of the concept of unfair dismissal 
in Sweden and England whilst drawing the reader’s attention to the different 
interpretations that the courts in these countries have given to the term 
“employee”. It also highlights other eligibility criteria, such as whether an 
open-ended full time contract exists or whether a minimum period of 
continuous employment has been satisfied before the employee can enjoy 
national statutory protection from being unfairly dismissed. This approach is 
aimed to serve as an illustrative example of some of the national differences 
that exist between these Member States’ concepts of unfair dismissal. 
Although the comparison only deals with the employee’s eligibility to make 
a claim for unfair dismissal it is one of many legislative concepts at national 
level capable of creating an unlevelled playing field. As highlighted earlier 
in this thesis, social protection has come under increased scrutiny in the 
internal market, as legal systems with lower social protection and labour 
costs has been claimed to create a competitive advantage to employers 
operating in those jurisdictions.
146
 
 
3.2 Unfair Dismissal in Sweden and 
England and Swedish and English 
“Employees” 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Section 7 of the Swedish Employment Protection Act, (“LAS”)147, operates 
to provide that “employees” who are employed under an open-ended 
contract of employment are treated fairly in the workplace and enjoy 
protection against unfair dismissal. It follows that such employees only can 
be dismissed on objective grounds and that the employer must have a valid 
and objective reason for the termination, and that it must be related to the 
employment relationship.
148
  
 
The “corresponding” English provision is found in the Employment Rights 
Act 1996, (“ERA”), section 94(1) which guarantees English “employees” 
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with continuous employment of two years
149
 or more the right not to be 
unfairly dismissed. For a dismissal to be fair it must be fair both 
substantively and procedurally. 
 
3.2.2 National Eligibility Criteria in Sweden and 
England 
In both Sweden and England the legislator has imposed certain eligibility 
criteria which operate to limit the protection against unfair dismissal to 
certain categories of workers. 
 
3.2.2.1 Exclusion of certain categories of Employees 
The Swedish unfair dismissal protection under LAS excludes the following 
categories of employees from its scope: 
 
 employees who due to their  work responsibilities and conditions of 
employment will be deemed to be in a leading or comparable 
position within the company;  
 
 employees who are family members of the employer;  
 
 employees who are employed to work in the employer’s household; 
and 
 
 employees who are employed with special employment support, in a 
protected form of work or in apprenticeship employment.
150
 
 
Swedish law purposively interprets the excluded categories narrowly. This is 
in keeping with the fact that section 1 is mandatory and that any attempts to 
contract out of the employment protection offered by LAS will be 
considered null and void.
151
 There are different reasons motivating the 
exclusion of the above groups from protection under the above Act. The 
exclusion of the first category is mainly due to the fact that independent 
contractors and other workers excluded under the first provision generally 
are considered to be in a better bargaining position and hence in a less 
dependent position.
152
  
 
In England, certain categories of employees have also been excluded from 
protection under the ERA 1996. The excluded English employees are: 
 
 employees who are working under illegal contracts (unless the 
employee was  
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 unaware of the illegality); 
 
 members of the armed forces and the police service;  
 
 employees working for government departments where a national 
security certificate has been issued; and  
 
 fishermen who are remunerated by a share of the profits. 
 
3.2.2.2 Open-ended contracts and Continous 
employment 
The requirement that the Swedish employee is employed under an open-
ended contract of employment has already been mentioned. In England 
there is no stipulation of such a requirement, although, it would appear 
unlikely that an employee under a fixed term contract would be able to 
claim unfair dismissal on the expiry of such a contract, (as the presumption 
would be that the dismissal was due to the contract expiring rather than any 
other reason). Instead the British legislator uses a concept of continuous 
employment to limit the protection afforded against unfair dismissal to 
certain categories of employees and has recently increased the required 
continuous employment from one year to two in an attempt to reduce the 
amount of costly claims being brought against British employers.
153
 In this 
respect, it is interesting to note that the Swedish legislator, contrary to the 
British, has not actively sought to exclude certain categories of employees 
through this criterion. Instead the 1
st
 paragraph of section 4 LAS 
presupposes that all contracts of employment are open-ended contracts of 
employment.
154
 
 
3.2.3 Swedish Employees  –v – English 
Employees 
The eligibility criterion that without question has received the most attention 
in the literature, as well as politically, is without doubt the definition of the 
term employee. Only those who fit the definition of employee are currently 
afforded protection against unfair dismissal. Both the Swedish and the 
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British courts have developed fine tests to assist them in the exercise of 
deciding which workers are considered employees. 
 
3.2.3.1 The Swedish Employee and the relevant 
Assessment Criteria 
There is no statutory definition of the term employee in LAS, instead the 
interpretation has developed through a combination of judicial 
interpretations – in particular by the Supreme Court (“HD”)155, the Labour 
Court (“AD”)156 and through preparatory works.157  
Swedish law imposes no formality requirements in respect of the creation of 
a contract of employment and an orally concluded contract or a contract 
concluded through the parties’ subsequent course of dealings is as valid as a 
written contract.
158
 In a HD case from 1949
159
, the multi-factor test which 
currently is used to determine when a contract of employment exists was 
first expressed in the following terms: 
 
“The question whether someone, from a legal point of view, is someone 
else’s employee or not is to be determined by what can be said to have been 
agreed between the parties. When interpreting what has been agreed, one 
needs to consider all the relevant circumstances of the contract at the time 
the contract was concluded and must not allow one particular term of the 
contract to decide what has been agreed. It may also be of assistance to 
consider the parties’ financial or social positions as these may be indicative 
of how the agreement is to be interpreted”.   
 
According to the multi-factor test the court’s decision should be based on the 
general impression that the specific facts of the case viewed together 
produces.
160
 Contrary to what the position is when the terms of a normal 
commercial contract is interpreted by the court, the interpretation is therefore 
not limited to what the parties at the time of entering into the contract had 
expected their contractual positions to be. Instead it will be important to 
consider how the parties have conducted themselves throughout the duration 
of the contract as this will be viewed as a valuable source of evidence of 
how the parties originally considered their relation. Circumstances and state 
of affairs which assist to explain the parties’ relationship and their dealings 
will also be relevant as independent factors for the purpose of assessing their 
contractual relation.
161
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In summary, the criteria that are frequently used by the Swedish courts to 
determine whether a contractual relation between two parties amounts to that 
between the parties to a contract of employment are: 
 
1) Whether there is a personal duty to perform; 162  
 
2) Whether direction and control was exercised by employer; 
 
3) The length of the engagement and the lack of pre-specified tasks;  
 
4) Whether the work that the worker performs is for the same employer 
and represents the principal share of his/her total work;  
 
5) Whether the worker provides services for one employer only;  
 
6) Whether the employer supply the equipment;  
 
7) Whether there is an element of guaranteed remuneration and 
reimbursement work related expenses; and 
 
8) The worker’s financial dependence.163 
 
3.2.3.1.1 Personal duty to perform 
A lot of emphasis was traditionally placed on whether the contract placed 
the worker under a personal duty to perform the work. The current approach 
is more focused on whether the work actually has been performed by the 
worker who has agreed to perform. Where the worker has performed work 
personally there is generally an inclination towards considering the worker 
an employee. In contrast, where the worker has not performed the work 
personally and is not contractually obliged to either but is free to sub-
contract others to perform the contract the situation is usually more akin to 
an independent contractor situation.
164
 
 
3.2.3.1.2 Direction and Control exercised by employer 
The fact that the work is done in accordance with the employer’s directions 
and that it is performed under his control is generally a strong indicator that 
the worker should be seen as an employee. It should however be noted that 
an element of control is not a pre-requisite in order to arrive at the 
conclusion that a worker is an employee. In particular it has not been 
considered significant in situations where the lack of control is due to the 
fact that the worker possesses higher skills than the employer and this is the 
reason for control not being exercised.
165
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3.2.3.1.3 Length of engagement and lack of pre-specified 
tasks 
Where an engagement is for a longer period and the worker is performing 
tasks and work directed by the employer on an ad-hoc basis compared to 
pre-specified tasks that the worker from the outset has been contracted 
specifically to perform the worker will generally be considered an 
employee. It should however be noted that nothing prevents that shorter 
engagements also may amount to contracts of employment.
166
 
 
3.2.3.1.4 The work that the worker performs is for the 
same employer and represents the principal 
share of his/her work 
In circumstances where the worker is working predominantly for one 
employer the courts may be inclined to class the worker as an employee.
167
 
 
3.2.3.1.5 The worker provides services for one employer 
only and is prevented from providing services for 
another employer 
There is generally a presumption that a worker who provides services for 
one employer only and who for contractual reasons or due to the extent of 
his/her work is unable to provide similar services for another employer, is 
an employee.
168
 In AD 1979 nr 155 the circumstances of a contractual 
relation where the situation of the worker at the outset had been comparable 
to that of an independent contractor, was held to have shifted to that of an 
employee when the contractual relationship had been altered in such a way 
that the independent contractor had become more and more dependent on 
the employer.
169
 
 
3.2.3.1.6 Supply of equipment from the employer 
Where work is performed with the use of the employer’s equipment or tools 
there is generally a presumption in favour of a contract of employment.
170
 In 
situations where the worker provides his/her own equipment there is equally 
a presumption that the worker is an independent contractor. In the case AD 
1981 nr 121 the court considered lorry drivers of a distribution company to 
be independent contractors following a re-organisation which had meant 
that the ownership of the valuable lorries had been transferred to each of the 
individual drivers.
171
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3.2.3.1.7 An element of guaranteed remuneration and 
reimbursement of expenses 
Where at least part of the remuneration is guaranteed rather than 
performance related and disbursements such as expenses incurred by the 
worker in the course of the employment are being reimbursed there is an 
argument in favour of a contract of employment.
172
 
 
3.2.3.1.8 Financial dependence 
The degree of economic dependence necessary for a worker with a low 
degree of subordination to be considered an employee varies depending on 
the branch of business. In a number of cases, the court has for example 
found freelancing journalists to be independent contractors despite a 
considerable element of financial dependence, only having one source of 
income and in one case more than 21 years of service.
173
 The rulings have 
been explained by the fact that the court tends to apply 
employee/independent contractor definitions established through established 
custom in the trade or by collective agreements.
174
 The justification for the 
court’s harsh approach appears to have been that the worker’s employment 
conditions were negotiated by collective agreement and therefore considered 
to have been reached by parties of equally strong bargaining power.
175
 
 
3.2.3.2 The English Employee and the relevant 
Assessment Criteria 
English law defines the employee by drawing a distinction between 
employees who provide their labour under a contract of employment or a 
contract of service and those who provide their labour under a contract for 
services.
176
 The latter category is generally referred to as self-employed.
177
  
Section 230(1)-(2) ERA1996 defines an employee as “an individual who has 
entered into or works under…a contract of employment”. A contract of 
employment has further been defined to mean “a contract of service or 
apprenticeship, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral 
or in writing.” 
 
The absence of any statutory definitions (or comprehensive guidelines) of 
either a “contract of service” (under which an employee is contracted to 
work) or a “contract for services” (under which the self-employed works) 
has resulted in different tests being developed to differentiate between 
employees and the self-employed. The currently favoured test is referred to 
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as the multiple test and was introduced by the case of Ready-Mixed 
Concrete.
178
 In accordance with the multiple test, the existence of a contract 
of service will, (in a similar fashion to the Swedish multi-factor test), be 
determined by careful consideration of several factors.  
 
The case of Ready-Mixed Concrete dealt with the employer’s duty to pay 
national insurance. It concerned an individual who had been an employee for 
a year when a new system of delivery was introduced. Under the new 
delivery system the drivers were to be treated as self-employed independent 
contractors. When the employee six years later entered into a new written 
contract for the carriage of concrete and bought a lorry through a finance 
company associated with his employer’s business and painted in the 
company’s colours, the Court of Appeal concluded that a contract for 
services existed and that the individual therefore fell outside of the 
“employee” definition. This, despite the fact that the employer always had 
been able to require the driver to drive the lorry for the maximum hours 
permitted and the driver was required to wear the company’s uniform and 
carry out all reasonable orders “as if he were an employee” of the company. 
Although there were many things indicating that the driver was an employee 
the Court of Appeal emphasised the fact that he had had the “ownership of 
the instrumentalities”. 
 
Since the case of Ready-Mixed Concrete, three key areas have emerged as 
the most important for determining whether a contract of service exists and 
the presence of the following factors can therefore be said to be the most 
significant:  
 
1) Personal Service – i.e. whether the employee is under a contractual 
duty to personally perform services for the employer in return for a 
wage or remuneration; 
 
2) Mutuality of Obligation – i.e. the obligation on the employer to 
provide work and the obligation on the employee to accept that work; 
 
3) Control – i.e. the employer exercises a certain element of control 
over the employee’s work.  
 
Other factors can nevertheless also be important in determining whether a 
contract of service exists. 
 
3.2.3.2.1 Personal Service 
Where a contract provides that the worker is under a personal duty to 
perform and the work also has been performed by the worker personally, 
there is generally a presumption for a contract of service. Likewise, where 
the worker is free to arrange for a substitute worker to perform the services 
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or to sub-contract his service obligations, the worker’s status is usually more 
consistent with that of the self-employed or an independent contractor.  
 
The fact that a worker has been able to provide a substitute or has been 
entitled to delegate the work will however not necessarily prevent a finding 
of a contract of service where the right to delegate has been restricted to 
situations where the worker was unable to perform the work personally.
179
 
In comparison, where the worker’s ability to delegate his/her main duties 
has been largely unrestrained, a contract for services will generally be 
presumed, even if the individual worker never actually exercised the right to 
provide a substitute.
180
 
 
3.2.3.2.2 Mutuality of Obligation 
Carmichael
181
 is one of the leading cases on mutuality of obligation. It 
concerned two tour guides who had performed a series of temporary 
contracts and the question was whether, looking at the overall arrangement, 
(including the time between the periods of work) a contract of service 
existed. However, because there was no obligation on the employer to 
provide work and the individuals were free to decline to work when it was 
offered to them, (and indeed also had declined work on several occasions), it 
was held that the individuals could not be considered to be employees. 
 
A different conclusion was however reached in the case of ABC News 
Intercontinental Inc v Gizbert
182
, which concerned the employment status of 
a TV reporter. Although the ABC were under an obligation to offer the 
reporter 100 days work per year, the reporter was under no express 
contractual obligation to accept work. On the basis of the high level of 
control that the ABC exercised over the reporter, the restrictions on the 
reporter to work for a competitor and the reporter’s place in the 
organisation, the EAT was however prepared to assert that the reporter was 
under an implied obligation to accept or refuse assignments in good faith 
and was thereby able to find that an overreaching “umbrella” contract 
(under which the reporter was held to work even between the periods of his 
assignments) existed. A similar conclusion was reached in the cases of 
Quashie v Stringfellows
183
 and Drake v Ipsos Mori
184
 which involved the 
employment status of a lap dancer and an ad hoc market researcher. 
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3.2.3.2.3 Control 
Control has been said to ...“include the power of deciding the thing to be 
done, the way in which it shall be done, the means to be employed in doing 
it, the time when and the place where it shall be done”. 185 
 
Case law tends to focus on the extent to which the individual is controlled 
and the manner in which they carry out their tasks during the engagement. 
The fact that a worker is told to work from of a particular place of work and 
of his/her working days and hours combined with the fact that the worker is 
subject to the employer’s day to day directions and rules and policies is 
generally a strong indication of the worker being an employee. The general 
rule is however not without exception and many employees, because of their 
particular skills and expertise, will naturally be subject to very little control 
from their employers. Conversely, independent contractors can be subject to 
relatively high levels of supervision. 
 
3.2.3.2.4 Other relevant factors 
In the case of Market Investigations
186
 Cooke J stated that;  
“No exhaustive list can be compiled of the considerations which are 
relevant to [the] question, nor can strict rules be laid down as to the 
relevant weight which the various considerations should carry in particular 
cases. The most that can be said is that control will no doubt always have to 
be considered, although it can no longer be regarded as the sole 
determining factor; and that factors which may be of importance are such 
matters as whether the man performing the services provides his own 
equipment, whether he hires his own helpers, what degree of financial risk 
he takes, what degree of responsibility for investment and management he 
has, and whether and how far he has an opportunity of profiting from the 
sound management of his task”. 
 
This approach is in many ways similar to the Swedish multi-factor test, laid 
down by the HD case NJA 1949 p.768. 
 
3.3 Two national concepts of Unfair 
Dismissal 
3.3.1 Sweden 
The requirement that any dismissal needs to be objectively justified aims to 
strengthen the employee’s position and is in keeping with the fundamental 
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social and labour rights that became legally binding through the Treaty of 
Lisbon. At the same time the employer’s needs must also be accommodated. 
LAS does this by providing that redundancy is an objectively justifiable 
ground for dismissal.
187
 
 
3.3.1.1 Dismissal for Redundancy reasons 
In situations of redundancy, dismissals will generally be justified by 
economic, organisational or other similar reasons. However, even where a 
dismissal is justified, the employer will be under an obligation to follow a 
scheme of “last in first out” set out in section 22 LAS. An exception to this 
rule only applies to small employers with no more than 10 employees.
188
 
Such employers will be allowed to exclude two of the company’s key 
workers, (irrespective of their seniority), from the general operation of 
section 22 LAS.
189
 
 
An employee who has been dismissed on the grounds of redundancy will 
also, for a nine month period, be given priority in respect of any new 
positions, (within the employee’s previous division) that may become 
available. This right is however subject to the employee having been 
employed in the employer’s organisation for more than one year before 
he/she was made redundant and subject to the employee notifying the 
employer that he/she wishes to exercise the right to priority.
190
 
 
3.3.1.2 Dismissal for Personal reasons 
In order to be objectively justified, dismissals for personal reasons generally 
require that the employee is in breach of a material condition of his/her 
contract of employment or has failed to achieve something which is of 
significant importance to the employer and which the employee is aware 
that the employer places such significant importance on.
191
 
 
Dismissals justifiable for personal reasons can range from anything like 
theft to serious teamwork difficulties. Dishonest activities that have taken 
place at the place of work or against the employer are generally treated 
rather unsympathetically whereas crimes that have been committed outside 
of the course of employment rarely will be sufficient to objectively justify a 
dismissal. Sickness is generally not considered an objectively justifiable 
ground for dismissal unless the sickness is resulting in the employee being 
unable to perform any work of value. Alcoholism is also viewed as a form 
of sickness and the employer’s rehabilitation responsibilities can be 
extensive. Focus is however always placed on whether the employee is 
deemed suitable to continue in the employment.
192
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3.3.2 England 
There are five potentially fair reasons for dismissal under section 98(2) of 
the ERA 1996; conduct, capability, redundancy, breach of a statutory 
restriction, and “some other substantial reason”. It will thus be necessary for 
the dismissing employer to show that the dismissal took place for one of 
these reasons.
193
 According to section 98(4), ERA 1996, the employer must 
also show that he acted reasonably in treating that reason as sufficient to 
justify dismissal.
194
 
 
3.3.2.1 Potentially fair reasons for dismissal 
In order for a dismissal to be considered fair the dismissing employer must 
be able to show that its decision to dismiss was based one or more of the 
potentially fair reasons within subsection 98(2) ERA 1996 or “some other 
substantial reason”.195 
 
3.3.2.2 Reasonableness of the dismissal 
Once a potentially fair reason for the dismissal has been established under 
section 98(1) ERA 1996, the tribunal needs to decide whether the employer 
acted reasonably in dismissing the employee for that reason. The approach 
that the tribunal needs to take to determine reasonableness will depend on 
the reason for the dismissal. In most cases the test for reasonableness is 
however the test set out by section 98(4) ERA 1996:  
“Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the 
determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having 
regard to the reason shown by the employer) -  
a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and 
administrative resources of the employer’s undertaking) the employer 
acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason 
for dismissing the employee, and  
b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits 
of the case.” 
The test laid down by section 98(4) ERA 1996 is objective and the tribunal 
needs to decide whether the employer’s decision to dismiss the employee 
fell within the “range of reasonable responses” that a reasonable employer 
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in those circumstances and in that business might have taken.
196
 For the 
purposes of this test, it is irrelevant whether or not the tribunal would have 
dismissed the employee, had it been in the employer’s shoes. The test 
applies both to the employer’s decision to dismiss and to the procedure by 
which the decision was reached.
197
 
 
It is the reasonableness of the employer’s conduct that the tribunal has to 
assess, not the injustice that the employee has suffered.
198
 The tribunal must 
also disregard any circumstances which were not known to the employer at 
the time of the dismissal.
199
 
 
3.3.2.2.1 Conduct dismissals 
Misconduct is a potentially fair reason for dismissal. In serious cases of 
misconduct the employer may be able to rely on one single act of 
misconduct. Less serious but repeated acts of misconduct will also suffice. 
Examples of misconduct are; disobeyance of reasonable orders; breach of 
certain terms of the contract of employment; theft or dishonesty; 
unauthorised absence; violence at work; alcohol or drug abuse (although 
this may also be treated as an illness); disclosure of confidential 
information; competing or preparing to compete with the employer’s 
business and repeated poor attendance. In more limited circumstances it 
may also be considered fair for an employer to dismiss an employee for 
misconduct that has taken place outside of his place of work.
200
 
 
In cases of conduct dismissals, the employer must be able to show that it, at 
the time of the dismissal; believed the employee to be guilty of misconduct; 
had reasonable grounds for believing that the employee was guilty of that 
misconduct and that it, at the time it formed that belief on those grounds, 
had carried out as much investigation as was reasonable in the 
circumstances.
201
 
 
3.3.2.2.2 Capability or qualification dismissals 
An employee’s lack of capability or qualifications to do his/her job can 
potentially be a fair reason for dismissal.
202
 Capability has been interpreted 
to mean an employee’s “skill, aptitude, health or any other physical or 
mental quality”203. Capability dismissals generally fall within two 
categories; the first category consists of dismissals relating to the 
employee’s poor performance or attitude whilst the second category consists 
of dismissals related to the employee’s ill health.  
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Qualification dismissals are dismissals relating to any “degree, diploma or 
other academic, technical or professional qualification” of relevance to the 
employee’s position.204 Dismissals relating to qualification most commonly 
arise soon after recruitment when it emerges that the employee does not 
have the necessary qualifications.
205
 However they can also arise where an 
employee is employed on the basis that he/she will obtain certain 
qualifications but fail to do so
206
 or where the employer’s requirements 
change
207
 or where the employee loses his/her qualifications during 
employment.
208
 
 
Where a dismissal has taken place on the grounds of capability or 
qualification the tribunal will determine whether the employer acted 
reasonably by considering factors such as; whether the employee knew what 
was required of them; whether the employer took steps to minimise the risk 
of poor performance; whether there was a proper appraisal of the employee 
and the problem was identified; whether the employer provided training, 
supervision and encouragement; whether the employer warned the employee 
of the consequence of failing to improve; whether the employer gave the 
employee a chance to improve and in some cases, possibly also whether the 
employer considered alternative employment positions for the employee. 
 
3.3.2.2.3 Redundancy dismissals 
Redundancy is a potentially fair reason for dismissal. A redundancy 
situation exists where the dismissal can be said to be “wholly or mainly 
attributable to” the employer either; 
a) ceasing or intending to cease to carry on the business for the purposes of 
which the employee was employed by it, (i.e. business closure); or  
b) ceasing or intending to cease to carry on that business in the place where 
the employee was so employed, (i.e. workplace closure); or 
c) having a reduced requirement for employees to carry out work of a 
particular kind or to carry out work of a particular kind at the place 
where the employee was employed to work, (i.e. reduced requirement 
for employees).
209
 
When it comes to cases of dismissals for redundancy reasons, the employer 
will generally not be considered to have acted unreasonably provided that it 
has; warned and consulted all of the affected employees (or their 
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representatives); applied fair selection criteria and where reasonable to do 
so, took reasonable steps to avoid minimise redundancies by redeploying 
potentially redundant employees. 
 
3.3.2.2.4 Breach of Statutory restriction dismissals 
A dismissal will be potentially fair if the employee’s continued employment 
would mean that either the employer or the employee would contravene a 
statutory duty or restriction.
210
 It will however be necessary for the 
employer to show that the employee’s continued employment actually 
would contravene a statutory duty. The fact that the employer reasonably 
believed that the employee’s continued employment would contravene a 
statutory duty will not be sufficient.
211
 (A reasonably held belief can 
however sometimes be sufficient under the potentially fair reason “some 
other substantial reason” below).212 
 
Examples of situations that often fall under the statutory restriction category 
are situations where continued employment would be in breach of 
immigration rules; where the employee has lost his/her driving licence and 
driving forms part of his/her employment, where the employee has failed to 
obtain certain vocational qualifications which are and where the employee 
discovers that the employee has or has received a criminal record. 
 
In cases of dismissals on the grounds of statutory restriction, the tribunal 
will consider whether the employer acted reasonably by looking at the 
extent of the statutory restriction and the extent to which it affects the 
employee’s ability to do his/her job; the duration of the statutory restriction 
and potential alternatives to dismissal such as adjustments to the employee’s 
job description or alternative employment. 
 
3.3.2.2.5 Some other substantial reason dismissals 
Section 98(1)(b) ERA 1996 does not offer much guidance in respect of what 
situations that this category is intended to cover. Following the recent 
abolition of retirement as a separate potentially fair reason for dismissal, 
dismissals that take place on the basis of an employee’s age and that the 
employer is able to justify are now likely to be for “some other substantial 
reason”. For dismissals under this category it is sufficient for the employer 
to show that the reason for the dismissal is of a kind that could justify the 
dismissal of an employee holding the job in question. The case of Willow 
Oak Developments Ltd v Silverwood
213
 it was established that it is 
necessary to show that the dismissal actually did justify the dismissal in 
question.  
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The distinction is important as it means that once the employer has been 
able to establish that he/she has dismissed the employee for a potentially fair 
reason, the dismissal will be held to be fair (subject to it not being 
procedurally unfair) as long as the employer’s decision to dismiss was 
within the range of “reasonable responses” which will be a matter for the 
tribunal to decide upon. 
 
Whether the employer’s reason to dismiss falls within the range of 
reasonable responses will inevitably depend on the circumstances of the 
case but it could depend on whether the employer; investigated the situation; 
consulted with the employee; warned the employee of the risk of dismissal; 
gave the employee an opportunity to state their case and explored 
alternatives to dismissal. It may also be relevant to consider and compare 
the needs of the employer with those of the employee. The principles 
established by the case of British Home Stores Ltd v Burchell
214
 applied in 
cases relating to conduct may also be relevant.
215
 
 
3.3.2.3 Fair dismissal procedure 
When applying and interpreting the statutory requirements laid down by the 
ERA 1996 the courts and the tribunals have developed a best practice 
concept which means that an employer, in order to act reasonably, has to 
follow a fair procedure when dismissing. In the majority of cases, 
(excluding cases of dismissals for redundancy), this will mean following the 
Acas Code which provides that the employer, before dismissing an 
employee should investigate the issues fully, inform the employee of the 
issues in writing, conduct a disciplinary hearing or meeting with the 
employee and inform the employee of the decision in writing. The case of 
Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd
216
 also established the “no difference 
rule” which in effect means that where a dismissal is procedurally unfair, 
the employer will be prevented from arguing that the dismissal should be 
viewed as fair because the procedural unfairness would have made no 
difference to the outcome. Failure to follow the Acas Code will not render 
any dismissal automatically unfair but may lead to an increase/decrease in 
compensation of up to 25% to reflect the extent of compliance with the 
Code. 
 
3.3.2.4 Automatically unfair dismissals 
Some dismissals are considered to be automatically unfair. That is to say 
that, irrespective of whether the procedure followed by the employer has 
been fair, certain reasons will never be considered fair.  
 
The most important categories of automatically unfair dismissal are: 
 Health and safety dismissals;  
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 Pregnancy or childbirth related dismissals;  
 Dismissals for asserting a statutory right, including most rights 
conferred under the Employment Rights Act 1996 such as; a right not to 
suffer an unlawful deduction; a right to minimum notice; a right to time 
off for union activities and duties;  
 Dismissals relating to union membership; non-union membership; trade 
union recognition or taking part in protected industrial action;  
 Dismissal for asserting any right under the Working Time Regulations 
1998;  
 Dismissal for making a protected disclosure under the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998; 
 Dismissal in connection with a refusal by a shop worker to undertake 
Sunday work;  
 Dismissal in connection with performance of certain duties as an 
employee representative;  
 Dismissal in connection with performance of certain duties as a pension 
scheme trustee;  
 Dismissal in connection with the national minimum wage;  
 Dismissal in connection with carrying out jury service;  
 Dismissal in connection with exercising the right to be accompanied to a 
disciplinary or grievance hearing;  
 Dismissal for asserting certain rights as a part time worker or fixed term 
employee; and 
 Dismissal in connection with an application for flexible working. 
Where an automatically unfair dismissal has taken place, all that the 
employee needs to establish to obtain a finding that the dismissal was unfair 
is that the dismissal was for one of the above reasons. The manner in which 
the employer handled the dismissal will be irrelevant. The normal eligibility 
criterion of one or two years’ continuous employment will generally not 
apply to automatically unfair dismissals either. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
National laws regulating employment protection are generally justified by 
the need to protect workers from arbitrary decisions as well as to shift some 
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of the social costs of labour turnover to the dismissing employer. In some of 
the EU’s Member States, such as the UK, the role allocated to the state in 
this regard is relatively passive and has been described as “non-
interventionist”.217  
 
In a comparative report on employment protection
218
 the strictness of 
different national systems has been measured and compared by the use of 
different employment protection indicators compiled from different factors 
relevant to the overall costs and procedures involved in a dismissal. The 
report which was produced in 2008 revealed the UK as the one of the EU’s 
Member States where employment protection is the least strict. Other 
countries that were mentioned as countries with weak employment 
protection traditions were the US and Australia. Interestingly, the low 
strictness levels in those countries were however considered to not 
necessarily be linked to the legal Anglo-Saxon heritage of those countries 
but rather to the regulation of temporary contracts. Both the Swedish as well 
as the English employer are however also relatively free to take advantage of 
the flexibility offered by the use of such contracts and other sources
219
 do 
not seem to suggest that the use of temporary contracts has replaced the 
normal open-ended contract of employment to circumvent the protection 
afforded by the national concepts of unfair dismissal. Instead, access to 
protection of unfair dismissal in England is primarily restricted by various 
eligibility criteria and a narrower interpretation of the term “employee”. In a 
comparative study of Sweden, the United Kingdom, France and the United 
States the Swedish definition of the term “employee” was found to be the 
most far reaching. Rönnmar has also suggested that the Swedish 
interpretation of the term puts less emphasis on the subordination element.
220
 
 
It is also worth noting the increased presence of another English statutory 
concept, “worker” which over the last decades has seen more and more 
rights afforded to it. According to section 230(3) ERA1996 the English 
worker is defined as: 
 
“an individual who has entered into or works under, (or, where the 
employment has ceased, worked under), a contract of employment or any 
other contract whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral 
or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally 
any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by 
virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or 
business undertaking carried on by the individual.” 
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The introduction of this additional category was intended to create an 
intermediate class of protected workers, who on the one hand are not 
employees but on the other hand are not regarded as carrying on a business. 
Although the worker often is in a similar subordinate and dependant position 
vis-à-vis their employers as the employee, the English legislator has not 
wanted to extend the more generous protection enjoyed by the category 
classed as employees to this group. References to workers can therefore now 
be found in various statutes
221
 some of which are products or direct results of 
EU directives.
222
  
 
In comparison to the English employee, the English worker has considerably 
less extensive employment protection rights and in terms of protection 
against unfair dismissal, currently no protection at all. As pointed out by 
Sargeant and Lewis this is something that might seem a bit odd considering 
the increasing amount of rights conferred by the EU on the widely 
interpreted category of  workers (in the context of rights relating to free 
movement).
223
 In addition, when comparing this with the Swedish approach 
to employment protection under which many self-employed and workers 
also enjoy full protection
224
 it does indeed seem as if a not insignificant 
imbalance could exist between the protection afforded to the employees in 
the UK compared to the protection enjoyed by the Swedish employee. In 
particular as the English worker, (although not able to pass the tests 
qualifying him as an employee in England), may fit the Swedish definition 
of employee. 
 
It shall also be remembered that Article 30 of the CFR provides that all 
“workers” are entitled to protection against “unjustified dismissal” in 
accordance with Union law and national law and practice. The potential 
reach and effects of Article 30 shall be discussed further in chapter 5. 
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4 Unfair dismissal protection in 
the EU – the Acquired Rights 
Directive 
4.1 Introduction 
In the 1970’s there were no Treaty provisions granting the Union any 
explicit competence to take action to protect employees and any legislative 
measures therefore had to be adopted with reference to the functioning of the 
internal market. As seen in 2.3.2 economic and political developments in the 
EU opened the way for the adoption the Acquired Rights Directive
225
, at a 
time characterised by unprecedented restructuring and mergers.  
 
The Acquired Rights Directive complements the Member States’ own 
national unfair dismissal systems by introducing an additional layer of 
protection in three ways. It does so, firstly by providing for the automatic 
transfer of the employees’ contracts of employment to the new employer 
when the employer’s business changes hands; secondly by stipulating that 
dismissals for the reason of the transfer are not justified per se; and thirdly 
by requiring the employers to inform and consult with the employees 
affected. The provisions relating to the third element of protection will 
however not be considered further as it falls outside of the scope of this 
thesis.  
 
The directive has been said to exemplify the gradual involvement of the EU 
in the social affairs of the Member States following the Social Action 
Program in 1974 which sought to raise the living and working standards in 
the EU and to reduce the differences between the Member States’ national 
systems of employment protection.
 226
 
227
 The original version of the 
directive was first adopted in 1977
228
 and has since been amended twice, 
first in 1998
229
 and then again in 2001
 
when the current version came into 
force.  As previously highlighted, several concepts in both the original 
version as well as in the later versions have however been left to the Member 
States to define in accordance with their national laws and practices. The 
term “employee” is of these. A certain divergence between the Member 
States in respect of the level of employment protection under the directive is 
therefore unavoidable.
230
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The purpose of this chapter is to consider the rationale of the Acquired 
Rights Directive as well as the implementations of the directive’s provisions 
relating to unfair dismissal in Sweden and England. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion on whether, in light of the common EU definition 
“worker”, a common EU definition of the term “employee” should be 
introduced to achieve a more uniform application of the directive across the 
EU. 
 
4.2 The Purpose of the Acquired Rights 
Directive 
The Preamble of the first 1977 version of the directive describes its context in 
the [internal] market as follows: 
“... Economic trends are bringing in their wake, at both national and [Union] 
level, changes in the structure of undertakings, through transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses to other 
employers as a result of legal transfers or mergers...It is necessary to provide 
for the protection of employees in the event of a change of employer, in 
particular, to ensure that their rights are safeguarded...Differences still remain 
in the Member States as regards the extent of the protection of employees in this 
respect and these differences should be reduced.”  
 
It is further revealed that the intention of the directive was to “promote the 
harmonisation of the relevant national laws ensuring the safeguarding of the 
rights of employees and requiring transferors and transferees to inform and 
consult employees’ representatives in good time”.  
  
The legal basis for the adoption of the directive was Article 100 EEC (now 
Article 115 TFEU, ex Article 94 EC). It should however be noted that the 
directive aimed at partial harmonisation only. 
 
4.3 The “Employee” 
The scope of the directive only applies to employees. According to the current 
Article 2(1)(d) of the directive, the term “employee” refers to any person in 
the EU who is protected as an employee under national employment law. 
Although the directive does not set out to define the term further, Article 
2(2) of the directive makes it clear that the directive is without prejudice to 
national law as regards the definition of contract of employment (or 
employment relationship). It does however stipulate that employees shall not 
be excluded from the scope of the directive solely on the basis of the number 
of hours that they work or by the fact that the employee is employed under a 
fixed term contract or the fact that they are employed via an agency.
231
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It is interesting to consider the rationale behind the approach taken by the 
Court of Justice. In the case of Danmols Inventar
232
 (which was heard before 
any alterations to the directive had taken place) the Court of Justice 
considered the definition of the term “employee”. The question before the 
Court was whether or not a person who holds a large stake in a company and 
who also is the chairman of its board of directors may be regarded as an 
“employee” of that company within the meaning of the directive. 
 
What is interesting to note from the case is not the conclusion that the Court 
reached at but the way the Court arrived at its decision coupled with the fact 
that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant appears to have predicted the 
stance that ultimately was taken by the Court. The plaintiff had claimed that 
the term “employee” should be defined as someone working for an employer 
and is subject to the instructions and orders of that employer. A person 
carrying out work for a company, in which he holds a large share holding, 
did not fall within that definition the plaintiff argued. The defendant’s line of 
argument had been that the term “employee” (for the purpose of the 
directive), extended to such a person provided that he did not occupy a 
dominant position on that board.   
 
The Court reasoned as follows: 
 
”The Commission observes in the first place that it is necessary to establish 
a [Union] definition of the term “employee” within the meaning of Directive 
No 77/187. It takes the view that the term covers any person who in return 
for remuneration carries out work on behalf of, and as the subordinate party 
in a relationship with, another person. That definition does not mean that a 
person cannot be regarded as an employee within the meaning of the 
Directive because he possesses a certain, or even substantial, shareholding 
in the undertaking. On the other hand, the Directive does not apply where 
the person’s position in the undertaking is such that he is no longer the 
subordinate party in an employment relationship. 
 
It is common ground that Directive No 77/187 does not contain an express 
definition of the term “employee”. In order to establish its meaning it is 
necessary to apply generally recognised principles of interpretation by 
referring in the first place to the ordinary meaning to be attributed to that 
term in its context and by obtaining such guidance as may be derived from 
[Union] texts and from concepts common to the legal systems of the Member 
States.  
 
It may be recalled that the Court, inter alia in its judgment of 23 March 
1982 (Case 53/81, Levin, (1982) ECR 1035), held that the term “worker” as 
used in the Treaty, may not be defined by reference to the national laws of 
the Member States but has a Community meaning. If that was not the case, 
the [Union] rules on free movement for workers would be frustrated, since 
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the meaning of the term could be decided upon and modified unilaterally, 
without any control by the [Union] institutions, by the Member States, which 
would thus be able to exclude at will certain categories of persons from the 
benefit of the Treaty.   
 
It is necessary to consider whether similar considerations apply to the 
definition of the term “employee” in the context of Directive No 77/187. 
According to its Preamble, the Directive is intended to ensure that 
employees’ rights are safeguarded in the event of a change of employer by 
providing for, inter alia, the transfer from the transferor to the transferee of 
the employees’ rights arising from a contract of employment or from an 
employment relationship (Article 3) and by protecting employees against 
dismissals motivated solely by the fact of the transfer of the undertaking 
(Article 4).  
 
It is clear from those provisions that Directive No 77/187 is intended to 
achieve only partial harmonization essentially by extending the protection 
guaranteed to workers independently by the laws of the individual Member 
States to cover the case where an undertaking is transferred. Its aim is 
therefore to ensure, as far as possible, that the contract of employment or 
the employment relationship continues unchanged with the transferee so that 
the employees affected by the transfer of the undertaking are not placed in a 
less favourable position solely as a result of the transfer. It is not however 
intended to establish a uniform level of protection throughout the [Union] 
on the basis of common criteria. 
 
It follows that Directive No 77/187 may be relied upon only by persons who 
are, in one way or another, protected as employees under the law of the 
Member State concerned. If they are so protected, the Directive ensures that 
their rights arising from a contract of employment or an employment 
relationship are not diminished as a result of the transfer.  
 
In reply to the second question it must therefore be held that the term 
“employee” within the meaning of Directive No 77/187 must be interpreted 
as covering any person who, in the Member State concerned, is protected as 
an employee under national employment law. It is for the national court to 
establish whether that is the case in this instance.”  
 
The Court of Justice’s line of reasoning in Danmols Inventar shall be 
considered further in 4.5. By way of comparison it should however be noted 
that many of the other terms such as “transfer”, “ETO reasons” and 
“economic entity” have been given more purposive and directive compliant 
interpretations as the Member States in respect of these terms have allowed 
themselves to be influenced by the case law from the Court of Justice.
233
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As to the present interpretation of the term “employee” in Sweden and 
England, both the English TUPE regulations and the Swedish LAS, confer 
the enhanced protection afforded by the directive on “employees” only. 
Neither the Swedish nor the English legislator has sought to exclude 
employees in the public sector, thereby going slightly further than required 
by the directive. In both Sweden and England the term has been defined in a 
way which mirrors the interpretation techniques used by their national 
courts when determining who is an employee for the purpose of an unfair 
dismissal claim and the scope of the term is also thought to be the same as 
in the unfair dismissal cases, (see chapter 3). 
 
4.4 Unfair dismissal protection under the 
Acquired Rights Directive 
4.4.1 The Aquired Rights Directive in Sweden 
and England 
The Acquired Rights Directive has been implemented into Swedish law 
through sections 2(4), 6b and 7(3) of LAS and sections 4(2), 13(2) and 28 of 
the Co-determination Act, MBL
234
. In order to ensure that these sections 
conform to EU law they have to be interpreted in the light of EU law and 
existing case law. In England the directive has been implemented through 
the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 
2006
235
 (“TUPE”), which enhances the national concept of unfair dismissal 
protection by providing that certain transfer related dismissals will be 
automatically unfair. 
 
4.4.2 Article 1 – The scope of the Directive 
According to Article 1(a) of the directive, the directive only applies in 
situations where a “transfer” of an undertaking, business, or part of an 
undertaking or business to another employer has taken place as a result of a 
legal transfer or merger. 
 
Section 6b of the Swedish LAS does not contain any definition of a transfer 
of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business and the 
legislative preparatory works only provide that the concepts should be 
interpreted in light of the directive and EU’s case law.  
 
The English TUPE regulations apply where there is a “relevant transfer”. 
Reg. 3(1) TUPE defines this as; “a transfer of an undertaking, business or 
part of an undertaking or business situated immediately before the transfer 
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in the United Kingdom to another person where there is a transfer of an 
economic entity which retains its identity.” Reg. 3(2) further defines an 
“economic entity” as an organised grouping of resources which has the 
objective of pursuing an economic activity, whether or not that activity is 
central or ancillary. The TUPE regulations also apply to the situation where 
there has been a “service provision change”. This covers the situation 
where activities are contracted out to a contractor; where activities 
subsequently are transferred between contractors; and where activities are 
brought back in house from a contractor.
236
 
 
4.4.3 Article 3 – Automatic transfer of 
contractual rights and obligations 
Article 3(1) of the directive provides that the transferor’s rights and 
obligations existing under a contract of employment on the date of the 
transfer shall be transferred to the transferee by reason of the said transfer. 
Article 3(3) further provides that the transferee, after the transfer will be 
bound to observe the same terms and conditions which the transferor was 
bound by for a minimum period of a year.  
 
Section 6b of the Swedish LAS introduced the concept of automatic 
transfers of the employees’ employment relationships and acquired rights to 
the transferee. As collective agreements in Sweden constitute an important 
source of the employee’s terms of employment, the transferee will also be 
under an obligation to respect these in the same way as any other applicable 
contractual provisions will have to be observed, unless the transferee 
already is bound by another collective agreement.
237
 In England it is 
regulation 4(2) of TUPE that provides for the automatic transfer of the 
transferor’s rights, powers duties and liabilities in connection with the 
contract of employment, to the transferee. 
 
4.4.4 Article 4 – Automatically unfair dismissals 
Article 4(1) of the directive provides that a transfer of an undertaking, 
business or part of the undertaking shall not in itself constitute grounds for 
dismissal (by either the transferor or the transferee). The same Article does 
however also provide for an exception where a dismissal is for a reason 
which is economical, technical or organisational and entails changes in the 
workforce, a so called ETO reason. Exactly what constitutes an ETO reason 
is not entirely clear from the EU’s case law but considering almost every 
transfer is likely to have effects involving such changes and the Court of 
Justice having emphasised on the protective purpose of the directive, it 
would seem logical that the ETO exception should be given a narrow 
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interpretation with focus on saving economically weak companies in 
redundancy situations.
238
  
 
In Sweden this has been implemented through section 7(3) of LAS which 
provides that a dismissal which relates to a transfer does not per se constitute 
an objectively justifiable ground for dismissal. The same section also 
provides for an exception where a dismissal is for an ETO reason.  
 
In England Article 4(1) of the directive is implemented through regulation 
7(1) TUPE which provides that the dismissal of an “employee” (with the 
requisite period of continuous employment
239
), will be automatically unfair 
where the sole or principal reason for the dismissal is either; the transfer 
itself; or a reason connected with the transfer that is not an ETO reason, 
entailing changes in the workforce. This division is however almost 
artificial and despite some guidance
240
 from the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS) (in the context of changes to terms and 
conditions) it can be difficult to determine whether the reason for a 
dismissal has taken place because of the transfer or for a reason connected 
with it and ultimately it will be a question of facts to be determined by the 
employment tribunal on a case by case basis. 
 
4.5 Discussion 
It is important to note that the Acquired Rights Directive has been 
interpreted to provide for partial harmonisation only. The inevitable 
consequence of partial harmonisation is a certain divergence in the level of 
employment protection offered.
241
 As seen in 4.2 the Court in the case of 
Danmols Inventar specifically considered the interpretation of the term 
“employee” in the directive and reasoned that the directive had not intended 
to “establish a uniform level of protection throughout the [Union] on the 
basis of common criteria”. It is however worth mentioning that the Court 
acknowledged that the Commission had thought it would be necessary to 
establish a common Union definition of the term “employee” and held the 
view that the term would cover “anyone who in return for remuneration 
carried out work on behalf of, and as the subordinate party in a relationship 
with, another party”. That understanding also appears to have been shared 
by the plaintiff and the defendant. 
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Reference was also made to the case of Levin
242
 in which the definition of 
the term “worker” was held to have a Union meaning and as such was not 
open to the Member States’ own interpretations. In that case the Court had 
reasoned that to allow for anything but a Union definition would have 
produced a situation where the scope of the term could be decided upon and 
modified unilaterally by the Member States to the disadvantage of certain 
categories of persons who could be excluded from the benefits provided by 
the Treaty without any control by the Union institutions. The rationale was 
thus that different national interpretations of the term “worker” would result 
in the Union rules on freedom of movement for workers being frustrated. 
 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, the scope of the national term 
“employee” is potentially not insignificant between the EU’s different 
Member States. With this in mind it is easy to see how the present situation 
not only results in a certain divergence between the level of employment 
protection enjoyed by the employees throughout the EU, depending on 
which Member State they are from but possibly also a not inconsiderable 
difference in labour costs for companies established in the different Member 
States, (in the event of dismissals triggered by a business transfer situation 
caught by the directive). In light of the extensive and purposive 
integrationist-economic rationale relied on by the Court in respect of the 
Union term “worker” in Levin it is my view that a Union definition of the 
term “employee” in the context of the Acquired Rights Directive would go 
some way towards reducing the different levels of protection which 
presently are allowed to exist due to the directive making reference to 
national interpretations of the term.  
 
As pointed out by Sargeant
243
 the Court in the case of Danmols Inventar did 
however opt out of the purposive approach it had adopted in Levin by 
deciding that that logic did not apply because the directive only aimed at 
partial harmonisation, i.e. it only sought to extend the existing national rights 
relating to unfair dismissal to also include transfer situations. This despite 
the fact that the reduction of different levels of protection was mentioned as 
one of the directive’s initial aims. On the basis of the reference made to the 
directive’s partial harmonisation it is probably not incorrect to assume that 
the Court’s stance may have been due to a perceived lack of competence and 
regards being paid to the principle of subsidiarity.  
 
The EU’s competence in the field of employment protection as well as the 
limits imposed by the principle of subsidiarity will be considered further in 
chapter 6 but before I move on to that I will in chapter 5 consider the 
potential impact that the CFR, and in particular Article 30, may have on the 
Court’s perception of its jurisdiction in the field of dismissal protection. 
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5 The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 
5.1 Introduction 
As seen in 2.3.7 the Charter of Fundamental Rights, (“the CFR”) was given 
legal status by the Lisbon Treaty.  
In the Preamble to the CFR fundamental rights are stated to result “from the 
constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the 
Member States” and Article 6(1) of the TEU provides that “the Union shall 
recognise the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the [CFR] of 7 
December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which 
shall have the same legal value as the Treaties”.244  
 
With the inclusion of several employment rights
245
 now recognised as 
fundamental rights, the CFR has been described as ground breaking. As an 
independent source of rights not limited to national practice it has also been 
viewed as a potentially significant contribution to the promotion of 
employment rights and industrial relations in the EU.
246
 In the UK the 
potential effects of the CFR has been considered with much suspicion. The 
main concerns raised were however not that the CFR per se would create 
any new rights but that it would be relied on by the courts in future to extend 
existing rights that have their origin in the EU and which hence could have 
the effect of altering English law.
247
 This is despite the wording of Article 6 
CFR which states that the provisions of the CFR shall not extend, in any 
way, the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether, (as feared by the UK 
government), the CFR is capable of creating additional employment rights, 
including an autonomous right for the “workers” not to be “unjustified 
dismissed”. The absence of a Union definition of the term “worker” in the 
context of the CFR is also considered. 
 
5.2 Additional Employment Protection 
Rights? 
The CFR includes a large amount of specific rights relating to employment, 
with Article 30 of the CFR specifically referring to a right of protection 
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against “unjustified dismissal”. Recognition of the right to protection 
against unjustified dismissal as a fundamental right in the CFR confirms that 
a central element in the European social model is continuity in employment 
and that termination of employment relationships or contracts of 
employment must be justified. 
248
 
 
5.2.1 Article 30 and the absence of a ”worker” 
definition 
As already mentioned, Article 30 of the CFR contains protection against 
unjustified dismissal. In the English language version reference is made to 
“every worker” but other language versions make reference to “employees”. 
Although it is clear that the reference in the CFR is not to the “free 
movement-worker” it is less clear to whom the CFR is addressed and 
whether the term is to be defined by the Court of Justice or by the Member 
States themselves. A literal reading of Article 30 would appear to suggest 
that all categories of workers, (both private and public sector workers), enjoy 
the protection. It follows from this that all categories of employees 
(including those working in atypical employment and otherwise excluded 
from national employment protection against unfair dismissal) also would 
fall within this definition and the protective scope of Article 30.
249
 If this is 
correct, it would mean a wider scope than the definition given to the term 
employee in Sweden and England for the purpose of their national concepts 
of unfair dismissal and the protection under the Acquired Rights Directive, 
but would seem to be in line with the fact that the 1989 Charter originally 
was drafted as a Charter of the rights of citizens to a Charter for workers. 
Despite this, the reference to “worker” in the CFR must not to be confused 
with the concept of “worker” in the context of free movement. 
 
Another point to consider is whether Article 30 and the other rights in the 
CFR represent a minimum floor of rights or not. Different opinions have 
been expressed on this subject.
250
 If the CFR does represent a minimum 
floor of rights it would seem that a common Union definition would be 
required in respect of the right not to be unjustified dismissed as well as the 
concept of the term “worker” in order to ensure that the fundamental rights 
in the CFR apply universally to all of the Member States’ workers. If, on the 
other hand that is not the case and these concepts were to be defined at 
national level, the whole concept of “fundamental rights” would be highly 
questionable as the fundamental rights in the CFR only would be 
“fundamental” at the discretion and to the extent permitted by the individual 
Member States.  
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It is not difficult to envisage a situation where such “discretionary” 
fundamental rights could be narrowed down by the Member States 
governments for financial motives. The UK’s Conservative governments’ 
current deregulation politics and the recent increase in the eligibility criteria 
requirement from one to two years’ continuous employment is an 
illustrative example of  how the UK government already has managed to 
successfully reduce the category of protected employees in the context of 
claims for unfair dismissal. 
 
5.2.2 Effect on national unfair dismissal 
protection? 
Article 30 CFR does not use the word “unfair” or “unlawful” to describe the 
fundamental right to protection against dismissal that the worker is entitled 
to. Bercusson has suggested that the justification for the dismissal must be 
substantial rather than formal. He has contrasted this with the English 
position where a reason for dismissal needs to fall within one of the “fair” 
reasons. According to Bercusson, to satisfy Article 30, it will not be 
sufficient for an employer to show that the reason falls within a “fair” reason 
– instead he suggests that a dismissal under Article 30 only will be justified 
where it can be proven that the reason for the dismissal fulfils specific 
substantive requirements for termination as well as any relevant procedural 
requirements.
251
  
 
Whether this would have any practical difference in Sweden or England is 
however not clear as the national unfair dismissal systems in both Sweden 
and England are far from arbitrary systems where employers can carry out 
dismissals without substantive grounds. The scope is however admittedly 
potentially much wider by virtue of the protection in Article 30 being 
conferred on all “workers” coupled with the absence of any qualification 
criteria such as continuous employment or an open-ended contract of 
employment. 
 
5.3 The Future of Fundamental Rights 
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced two significant changes to fundamental 
rights. Firstly the CFR became legally binding and secondly, Article 6(2) of 
the TEU also provided that the EU would accede to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(“ECHR”).  
As seen earlier in 5.1 the CFR has been afforded the same legal value as the 
Treaties and is therefore legally binding on the institutions of the Union, and 
on the Member States when implementing Union law. (What this 
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qualification actually means will be considered in 6.3.3). Article 6(3) of the 
TEU also provided that “fundamental rights... as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute 
general principles of the Union’s law”. It should however be remembered 
that the Court already since the 1970’s, has considered the fundamental 
rights protected by the ECHR as forming part of the general principles of EU 
law and already in 2006, (before the CFR became legally binding), referred 
to it as a source of fundamental rights.
252
  
It would therefore appear that the Court of Justice has taken the view that the 
CFR is one of a range of sources it uses to identify general principles of law. 
In line with the wording of the Preamble, it has not been interpreted to create 
new rights, but to simply reaffirm rights as they result from various other 
sources. So far the indications are therefore that the Court will not, (at least 
not in the current political climate), seek to use the CFR in a more proactive 
way just because the CFR has become legally binding. The Member States, 
and in particular the UK, are (for somewhat different reasons) clearly 
anxious about the possible future effects of the CFR and have sought to 
restrain its possible effects in a range of ways. This can be exemplified by 
the reference in the CFR being altered from citizens to workers
253
, by the 
Member States insisting on the CFR expressly confirming that it does not in 
any way extend the competences of the EU
254
 and by the UK insisting on a 
Protocol being annexed to the CFR in an attempt to prevent the CFR from 
creating any new rights applicable to the UK, (unless the UK national law 
has provided for such rights independently).
255
  
In light of this, it has been suggested that it is unlikely that the CFR will 
have any far-reaching effects although the very existence of a legally binding 
formal list of rights has been predicted to generate an increase in the number 
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of rights-based challenges to the legality of EU or Member State action.
256
 
Bercusson has shown more enthusiasm and has even suggested that Article 
30 may contribute towards harmonisation of European labour law on 
dismissals. Two arguments have been put forward in support of this: 
1) Harmonisation of costs relating to unfair dismissals in the EU would 
reduce the risk of multinational companies facing restructuring from 
dismissing worker’s where it is financially advantageous.  
 
2) To harmonise (at a minimum level) the fundamental right to protection 
against unjustified dismissal, including procedural requirements, has 
been suggested to suit a well functioning European labour market.
257
 
 
In respect of the second argument, I have noted that this appears to 
presuppose that the “worker” in the CFR would be the same as the “worker” 
in the context of freedom of movement. The Court’s willingness to adopt an 
autonomous and extensive definition of the term “worker” has however been 
strictly confined to the policy area of free movement (and the Court’s 
reluctance to expand the concept into other areas has already been seen in 
chapter 4).
258
  
 
At the same time, the way that the Court has expanded the coverage of free 
movement law into the private sector should however not be marginalised. 
The Court has already shown a greater willingness to apply a more extensive 
interpretation to the term “worker” in the context of discrimination and 
equality law (which would suggest that the Court may be more willing to 
expand the concept to the CFR). The case of Allonby
259
 was a UK unfair 
dismissal and sex discrimination case concerning part-time lecturers who did 
not have their contracts renewed following the restructuring of their 
employer’s establishment. Instead they were rehired through an agency, and 
expressed to be employed as “self-employed independent contractors” under 
the terms of the new arrangement. The new contracts also meant that they 
were denied access to a certain pension scheme. It should also be noted that 
women represented a higher proportion of the part-time lecturers when 
compared with the group of lecturers that had had their contracts renewed 
with the employer directly. The Court of Justice did however find that the 
lecturers fell within the Union definition of “worker”. The Court reasoned 
that term worker within the meaning of ex-Article 141(1) EC (now 157 
TFEU) was not expressly defined in the EC Treaty and that it was necessary 
to apply “the generally recognised principles of interpretation, having 
regard to its context and to the objectives of the Treaty”. Among the 
objectives of the Union was to promote equality between men and women. 
Ex-Article 141(1) EC and the principle of equal pay was held to constitute a 
specific expression of the principle of equality for men and women, which 
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formed part of the fundamental principles protected by the legal order of the 
[Union]. For this reason, the Court reasoned that the term worker had to be 
given a wide and purposive [Union] meaning and could not be defined by 
reference to the Member States’ national legislation. The Court commented 
that the provisions of UK law which provided that only “employees” could 
join the pension scheme would be incompatible with ex-Article 141 and 
should be disapplied if their application was such that it adversely affected 
more women than men. 
 
Further, as Nielsen
260
 has emphasized, the Treaty provisions on free 
movement were originally only binding on the Member States and there is 
still some doubt as to whether the provisions relating to free movement can 
be relied on against private actors such as employers. The Advocate General 
in the case of Viking discussed the problem of horizontal direct effect at 
length in his opinion. From the cases of Viking and Laval it was however 
made clear that ex-Articles 43 and 49 EC, (now Articles 49 and 56 TFEU) 
had direct effect which the employers could rely on against the trade unions. 
It is no news that the criteria which have to be met for a Treaty provision to 
be capable of creating direct effect is that the provision is sufficiently clear 
and precise. As Nielsen quite rightly points out, some of the fundamental 
rights under the CFR are reasonably precise.
261
 Nielsen has thus suggested 
that the most important effect of the Lisbon Treaty on labour law might be 
the fact that the CFR has been elevated to a higher level in the hierarchy of 
sources and therefore now can take direct effect on the same conditions as 
other Treaty provisions, (subject to the particular provision being 
sufficiently clear and precise). 
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6 The Principle of Subsidiarity 
– How far does the EU’s 
Competences reach? 
6.1 Introduction 
It has always been a fundamental principle of EU law that the Union does 
not enjoy any general competence to legislate and must only “…act within 
the limits of the powers conferred on it…”.262 Therefore, in order for the 
Union to interfere in a specific field, it will be necessary to establish that the 
relevant competence exists. Further, the principle of subsidiarity also 
requires the Union to consider whether it is the appropriate body to act and if 
so, the Union will be required to make sure that the proposed action is 
proportionate. 
 
Where the Union has exclusive competence, the Member States cannot act in 
the field irrespective of whether appropriate legislation exist at Union level 
or not. The corollary of this is that where the Member States have not 
conferred power to act on the Union the legal competence remains with the 
Member States.
263
     
 
It has been suggested that the present state of European integration is 
revealed by the scope and distribution of competences between the EU and 
its Member States. The current distribution of competences has however 
been said to be at a crossroads with the development of the EU.
264
 
 
As seen in chapter 2, the social dimension of the EU has gradually evolved 
and the EU’s competence in the social field has also expanded. However, the 
expansion of the EU’s social competences has often been the subject of 
criticism, whether from a political point of view (where Member States lose 
power to act in a policy area which in large is viewed by the public as a 
national domain) or from an economic point of view (where increased social 
regulation and intervention by the EU is considered to have a detrimental 
effect on the economy).
265
 This critique is however not without faults and 
often fails to take account of the fact that the Member States, in a 
competitive internal market, on a practical level, often are blocked from 
exercising any national social policy competences that they have, due to the 
serious threat of social dumping.  
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The aim of this chapter is to seek to establish how far the EU’s competences 
reach in matters relating to employment and also consider the impact of the 
principle of subsidiarity both in this context as well as in the context of 
fundamental rights in the CFR. 
 
6.2 The EU’s Social Competences 
According to the Treaty, the Union’s aim is to realise the common objectives 
of the Member States and to coordinate policies of the Member States which 
concern the said objectives.
266
 As previously mentioned the Union does not 
have any general competence to act and can therefore only act where the 
relevant competences have been assigned to it by the Member States. 
Competences not conferred upon the EU remain with the Member States. 
This principle is affirmed by Article 5(2) of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty coming into force the EU’s competences were 
subject to extensive scrutinising as there was increased concerns raised over 
what has been referred to as a “creeping expansion of competences”.267 The 
result of the Laeken Declaration was that different competences were 
systematically catalogued in Articles 2-6 TFEU. 
 
6.2.1 Division of Competences after the Lisbon 
Treaty 
In very general terms it can be said that the TFEU distinguishes between 
three kinds of competences: 
 
1) Exclusive competence268(which means that only the EU may legislate  
          and adopt legally binding acts);  
 
2) Shared competence269 (in which the EU has a pre-emptive prerogative  
          to regulate); and 
 
3) Competence for the EU to coordinate, support and complement  
          policies of the Member States.
270
 
 
The areas that fall within the second category are set out in a non exclusive 
list in Article 4 TFEU and include the internal market, social policy, 
economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and fisheries, 
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environment, consumer protection, transport, trans-European networks, 
energy, area of freedom, security and justice and common safety concerns in 
public health matters. As an area of social policy, employment law is often 
said to fall within this category. The reason for no specific reference being 
made to employment has been explained as political.  
Instead, a special category
271
 of competences relating to economic 
employment and social policy was included in the TFEU after the category 
of shared competences but before the category of supporting, coordinating 
and complementary competences.  
 
Article 2(3) TFEU provides that the Member States shall “coordinate their 
economic and employment policies within the arrangements as determined 
by this Treaty, which the Union shall have the competence to provide” and 
Article 5(2) TFEU provides that “the Union shall take measures to ensure 
coordination of the employment policies of the Member States”. The legal 
consequences of a specific competence falling within Article 5 TFEU is 
however not entirely clear and the exact division between the different 
categories of social policy competences is further clouded by the many 
unwritten competences which include the principle of implied powers
272
, the 
concept of effet utile
273
, the decisions of the Court of Justice and the limits 
placed on national legislative action through the Member States’ own 
interpretations of the principle of subsidiarity.
274
 
 
6.2.2 The EU’s Competence in Employment 
related matters  
Whether regulation in social matters such as employment primarily is a 
Member State responsibility or not is a question which has been said to 
provoke different answers in different Member States. The spectrum is 
broad and ranges from Member States with more liberal traditions such as 
the UK which attributes the state a more passive role in social matters to 
Member States such as France with traditions imposing an obligation on the 
state to actively intervene in social matters to ensure an “ordre public 
social”. Over the last two decades, a slight but steady change towards more 
liberal traditions has been observed.
275
 
 
The EU has competence to adopt directives concerning “protection of 
workers where their employment contract is terminated”276 and, (as seen in 
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chapter 2 and 4), have not hesitated to exercise this competence in the past. 
However, regulation of dismissal can be both sensitive and complex, which 
explains why, in order to adopt a directive on the subject, the Council of 
Ministers “shall act unanimously”.277  
 
Expansion of the competences of the Union in the field of employment is 
further constrained by the influence of internal market considerations, the 
need for political consent and the expressed limitations on its powers which 
comes in via the principle of subsidiarity.  
 
6.3 The Principle of Subsidiarity 
The exercise of powers in the EU is regulated by the principle of subsidiarity 
which determines whether the EU should act or whether the Member States 
are better placed to take legal action in a specific area.
278
 A brief account of 
the history of the principle of subsidiarity has been included to assist the 
reader’s understanding of the context in which the principle has developed. 
 
6.3.1 ...before the Lisbon Treaty 
For many years the role attributed to the principle of subsidiarity was very 
limited. It was not until the 1980’s that the principle of subsidiarity officially 
became an integral part of Union law with an obligation on the Union to 
comply with the principle in the exercise of its powers. The success of the 
principle of subsidiarity has in part been explained by the transformation of 
the Union from the founding Treaty-based Economic Community towards 
an “ever closer political union” as this inevitably meant that focus was 
turned to the division of the legal, administrative and judicial competences 
between the Union and the Member States. The subsidiarity principle was 
first expressed in the Treaty of Maastricht in an attempt to counterbalance 
and justify the ongoing process whereby more and more competences were 
transferred from the Member States to the Union. 
Another explanation for the development of the subsidiarity principle which 
has been ascribed equal importance is the ambiguity of the EU’s identity 
between a Union of States and a Union of Citizens. When the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was approved at the summit in Nice 2000 the principle 
of subsidiarity was revisited as the universal validity that followed with 
fundamental rights was viewed to potentially have the capacity of 
undermining the legal sovereignty of the Member States.
279
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Before the Treaty of Lisbon the definition of the principle of subsidiarity 
was often criticised for being unclear in respect of the distinction between 
those competences referred to as “exclusive” and those referred to as 
“shared”, “joint” or ”concurrent”. In the case of the latter category of 
competences, it was argued that, although the Member States were assumed 
to have retained an overall competence, they could only act for as long as the 
EU had not usurped a particular field of law by passing legislation. The 
upshot of this argument was therefore that the subsidiarity principle could 
not apply to any matter covered by the original EEC Treaty and that there 
were could be no shared competences at all.
280
 As seen in 6.2.2 the Treaty of 
Lisbon did however assist to clarification this. 
 
 
6.3.2 ...after the Lisbon Treaty  
The wording of the subsidiarity principle has not changed much since the 
Treaty of Maastricht and the principle is now expressed in Article 5(3) TEU: 
“Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can 
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level.”  
Following the much criticised cases of Viking
281
 and Laval
282
 the scope of 
the principle of subsidiarity in employment matters has however been 
brought into question. Before Viking and Laval, (which were concerned with 
the fundamental right to strike), strong national labour laws, setting 
standards above the basic floor of rights guaranteed by the EU through 
Treaty provisions and directives, were actively encouraged as a 
counterweight to the effects of the internal market.
283
 By associating national 
labour laws with the internal market concept of distortion of competition, the 
Court of Justice did however reject the EU’s previous approach to national 
employment law policy and encouraged the Member States to engage in a 
race to the bottom in respect of their national employment law systems.
284
  
The starting point for the Court in Viking and Laval was the employer’s 
assertion of its free movement rights. The Court held that restrictions on the 
exercise of these rights only could be accepted to the extent that they were 
held to serve a proportionate legitimate interest. In other words – the status 
of the employer’s economic rights were not called into question, while at the 
same time the exercise of the social rights, stipulated by the EU were made 
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subject to a strict proportionality test.
 285
 The effects should however 
perhaps not be exaggerated and it should be noted that the Advocate General 
as well as the Court of Justice expressed concerns regarding social dumping 
and that it was realised that unrestrained exercise of economic freedom of 
movement may threaten existing jobs and working conditions to the extent 
that it may be characterised as an “abuse” of the exercise of economic 
freedoms.
286
 
 
6.3.3 ... in the context of Fundamental Rights  
The CFR expressly states in Article 51(1) that its provisions are addressed 
to the institutions of the EU with due regard to subsidiarity and only to 
Member States, “when they are implementing Union law”. 287  
 
The relevance of evoking the principle of subsidiarity in the context of 
fundamental rights has also been questioned as the fact that the principle is 
referred to begs the question of whether the Member States only are bound 
by fundamental rights to the extent that they do not contradict the principle 
of subsidiarity. According to Blanke the Union and the Member States are 
however strictly bound to respect the fundamental rights in the CFR and 
cannot avoid their obligation by reference to the principle of subsidiarity. He 
argues that to deny the validity of the fundamental rights in the CFR would 
destroy their character as universal rights and principles. Blanke has further 
suggested that fundamental rights should be regarded as “a minimum floor 
of rights common to all Member States” and that the principle of 
subsidiarity only applies where the Member States’ rights go beyond the 
fundamental rights in the CFR.
288
 If this is the correct approach it would be 
interesting to consider how the CFR would define a minimum floor concept 
of protection against unjustified dismissal.  
 
Closely linked with the above question is the central problem posed by 
Article 51(2) CFR which provides that the CFR does not establish any new 
powers or tasks for the Union. As Bercusson has pointed out the EU does in 
many cases lack explicit powers to promote many of the rights in the CFR. 
The effect of fundamental rights being confronted by lack of or limited EU 
competences is questionable as a situation where fundamental rights are 
subject to competences would undermine the whole concept of fundamental 
rights. Bercusson’s solution to this paradox is however for the powers of the 
EU to be expanded by the Court of Justice to the extent necessary to 
safeguard and enforce the rights in the CFR.
289
 Such an expansion could 
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perhaps include a common EU concept of protection against unjustified 
dismissal as well as a common definition of the term “worker” for the 
purpose of the CFR. 
 
 82 
7 Analysis and Conclusion 
This thesis set out to discuss whether different national interpretations of the 
term “employee” (in the context of unfair dismissal) sit comfortably with the 
rationale for the uniform Court of Justice term “worker” and whether this 
situation can be justified in the light of the potential unlevelling of the 
internal market and Article 30 of the CFR.  
 
The topic was approached by first considering the rationale for the EU’s 
wide interpretation of the term “worker” (in the context of free movement) 
and also how the Court’s approach has changed as the social dimension and 
EU employment law has developed. It was seen in chapter 2 how the Court 
has shown great willingness to extend the uniform EU concept of “worker” 
to the areas of equality and non-discrimination. The underlying rationales 
relied on by the Court in these contexts have varied but it does nevertheless 
not appear that the Court has struggled to justify a uniform definition of the 
term “worker” irrespective of whether the rationale relied on has been 
economic or social.  
 
Attention was then turned to the different interpretations given by the 
national courts in Sweden and England to the term “employee” (for the 
purpose of their national concepts of unfair dismissal, including the 
nationally implemented Acquired Rights Directive). As seen in chapter 3, 
the different tests employed by the national courts are very similar although 
it would appear that the English courts, in comparison to Sweden, have 
given the term “employee” a more narrow interpretation and that the 
Swedish courts have placed less emphasis on the subordination element. In 
addition, access to protection against unfair dismissal in England is more 
restricted by various eligibility criteria, such as the requirement of two years 
continuous employment. In Sweden the only eligibility criterion is the 
requirement of an open-ended contract of employment. Access to the 
additional layer of protection in the Acquired Rights Directive is also, due to 
the directive only applying to those who are “protected as an employee 
under national employment law”, subject to the additional national 
eligibility requirements mentioned above.  
 
With the new intermediate class of English “workers”, it would also appear 
that the difference in the scope of protection conferred by the Acquired 
Rights Directive on Swedish and English employees perhaps is greater than 
initially anticipated. In particular as the English worker, (despite not being 
able to pass the tests qualifying him/her as an employee in England), perhaps 
would fit the Swedish definition of “employee” (which has been more 
extensively interpreted). In comparison to the Swedish and English 
employees, the English worker enjoys no protection against unfair dismissal. 
This irregularity coupled with the Acquired Rights Directive’s aim to seek to 
safeguard the interests of the EU’s employees against the effects of the 
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internal market, is what made me question the explanation given by the 
Court for declining to give the term “employee” a Union meaning.  
 
It has already been seen that the Court of Justice in Danmols Inventar
290
 
declined the opportunity to give the term “employee” a Union meaning. The 
rationale for this was explained to be that the Acquired Rights Directive only 
sought to partially harmonise the protection afforded to the Member States’ 
employees and the Court’s purposive approach seen in Levin was hence 
abandoned. The Court specifically said that the Directive was not 
“...intended to establish a uniform level of protection throughout the [Union] 
on the basis of common criteria.”   
 
I have contrasted the approach taken by the Court in the context of the 
Acquired Rights Directive with the extensive and uniform definition given to 
the EU concept “worker” and I find the Court’s reasoning in Danmols 
Inventar difficult to accept. The Acquired Rights Directive was adopted for 
the purpose of safeguarding the rights of the Union’s employees whilst 
seeking to partially harmonise the level of social protection guaranteed to the 
EU’s employees in an attempt to raise the living and working standards in 
the EU. Further, the Court of Justice has not been unwilling to assist with the 
interpretation in respect of the concept of a relevant transfer
291
 which assists 
in determining the applicability of the directive. The fact that a uniform 
interpretation of the concept relevant transfer has been thought necessary to 
define at EU level, makes it difficult to understand the basis for the Court’s 
justification that the interpretation of the term “employee” should be left to 
the Member States’ discretion. The explanation given of partial 
harmonisation is no more relevant to the concept of “employee” than to the 
concept of a “relevant transfer” as both of the concepts are applied to 
determine the applicability and scope of the directive and thus are capable of 
affecting labour costs differently depending on the interpretations applied.  
 
Whether the true explanation for the Court in Danmols Inventar declining to 
give  the term “employee” a Union meaning was due to the fact that the 
Acquired Rights Directive concerned an area of shared competence where 
the Member States in large had retained competence is impossible to answer 
although I do not wish to rule it out. With several of the employment rights 
in the CFR recently having been given the status of fundamental rights, 
including the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, it is however 
not impossible that the Court soon may be given an opportunity to consider 
its jurisdiction in respect of employment protection rights again.  
 
I have discussed the concept of unjustified dismissal in the CFR (which may 
have the potential of creating direct effect) which affords the right to 
protection against unjustified dismissal the elevated status of a fundamental 
right. As a fundamental right, Article 30 has been thought to produce a 
minimum floor of rights universally applicable to all of the EU’s Member 
States, (without concerns for the principle of subsidiarity). Any other 
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interpretation leads to the unacceptable situation of different categories of 
workers being granted different “fundamental rights” depending on which 
Member State they reside in (as is currently the position under the Acquired 
Rights Directive).  
 
As seen in chapter 4, I have queried whether the Court’s decision not to 
interpret the term ”employee” for the purpose of the Acquired Rights 
Directive may have been lack of competence or subsidiarity concerns as 
employment policy is a highly politically sensitive area of shared 
competence.  
 
The fact that the CFR (on the face of it) has not established any new powers 
or tasks for the Union must therefore be considered. Bercusson has pointed 
out that the EU does in many cases lack explicit powers to promote many of 
the rights in the CFR. Whether the Court would find itself able to rely on the 
CFR in order to expand its competences within the employment field 
therefore remains to be seen. The effect of fundamental rights being put into 
question due to lack of or limited EU competences has however been 
described as questionable as such an interpretation would undermine the 
whole concept of fundamental rights.  
 
There is however also an argument that the CFR has not introduced any 
rights which did not already exist. (It is on the basis of this argument that the 
UK’s “opt-out” protocol has been said not to carry much weight). However, 
if this is true, it would mean that the current position, whereby English 
employees but not English workers are guaranteed protection against unfair 
and unjustified dismissal is accepted. As previously highlighted this may be 
at odds with Article 30’s elevated status to a fundamental right as it in effect 
would mean that the Member States would have a discretion as to which 
workers that they allow the fundamental right in Article 30 to be conferred 
upon – in the same fashion that the English legislator, with the sanctioning 
of the Court of Justice’s approval, so far has managed to restrict the scope of 
the Acquired Rights Directive. 
 
Finally, the introduction of Article 30 CFR also raises the question whether a 
Union concept of unfair or unjustified dismissal should be introduced 
altogether. It is not my intention to argue for total harmonisation at EU level 
but I do consider that the concept of unjustified dismissal in Article 30 and 
the interpretation of the CFR concept “worker” should be given a purposive 
and universal Union interpretation, (although not necessarily the same 
definition that the Court has given to the “worker in the context of free 
movement).  
 
My reason for advocating for a Union concept is that it would provide the 
EU with a comparative measuring tool which can be used to ensure that all 
the Member States workers are guaranteed a minimum level of protection 
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against unjustified dismissal.
292
  Without a Union definition there is no 
minimum standard to measure potential national variations against. In 
addition, the risk of any further deregulation policies and a continued race to 
the bottom can hopefully be reduced. 
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